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ABSTRACT 
That South African municipalities, in vast majority, are experiencing serious financial 
problems is well-known to anyone with an interest in local government sector. Given that, the 
study considers the role of the Auditor-General (AG) in promoting sound financial 
management in municipalities. The disciplinary perspectives from which the inquiry is 
considered are law and public administration. The context for this consideration is the North 
West, a province which is inundated by poorly performing municipalities that are literally on 
the brink of financial and operational collapse. The study proceeds from the premise that 
efficient financial management practices are essential to the long-term sustainability of 
municipalities. The role of the AG is key in this regard in that the latter is a watchdog over state 
coffers and the pivot of the oversight mechanism over the management of public finances. 
Furthermore, the AG strives to institutionalise and promote a culture of good governance, 
accountability and transparency in municipalities. It achieves this through routine auditing and 
provision of audit recommendations that seek to improve municipalities’ internal controls.  
However, this purpose gets undermined, and eventually defeated, in the instance where audit 
recommendations are being ignored. Of concern is that the non-implementation of audit 
recommendations has become a norm in most municipalities in the North West. The study has 
considerable breadth in its analysis of this problem by looking closely into three municipalities: 
Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and Tswaing. It is not immediately clear why this trend is emerging or 
has emerged. In that note, a resolve to embark on this study was impelled by a sense of 
commitment to try to understand the real issue behind this trend and to see how best it can be 
countered. This brings the study to then ask: How can the AG’s recommendations be better 
and adequately given effect in the North West municipalities?  
In response, it will be argued that this issue cannot be solved by the AG alone. What is needed, 
instead, is the development of an action plan, policy and institutional framework that will guide 
and facilitate the multi-agency approach and inter-institutional collaborations towards 
addressing the problem. Further argument will be advanced to say that the efforts undertaken 
to reconstitute and strengthen the legal framework governing the AG through the 2018 
amendments to the Public Audit Act do not constitute a magic bullet solution to the dismal 
downward trajectory across the North West municipalities, as contemporary narratives seek to 
suggest.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
‘The audit outcomes of North West, the worst since 2012-13, clearly indicated the deteriorating 
accountability, a blatant disregard of our messages and recommendations, complacency and a lack of 
commitment to decisively address key areas of concern as well as a lack of political will to effect 
consequences.’1 - The Auditor-General, Mr Kimi Makwetu 
1.1.  Problem statement  
South Africa has adopted a multi-level system of government with authority being devolved 
and entrusted upon three levels of government. This system is reaffirmed by the 1996 
Constitution which provides that the government is constituted at national, provincial and local 
spheres.2 Steytler makes an intrinsically valid point that these spheres are ‘distinctive’ in their 
powers, ‘interrelated’ in a hierarchy of supervisory authority and ‘interdependent’ to perform 
the task of governance in a more cooperative manner.’3 Their cooperation must be based on 
mutual trust and good faith. Furthermore, each sphere is required to respect the constitutional 
status, powers and functions of the others and it enjoys a constitutionally entrenched 
autonomy,4 which includes fiscal.5 Pursuant to ensuring the proper exercise of this autonomy, 
the system of checks and balances has been introduced at each sphere.6 This system is an 
important safeguard to track and ensure optimal performance of public service, effective 
governance, accountability and efficient management of public finances.7  
Within the bigger scheme of mechanisms and practices to advance the latter aspirations is 
auditing practice. Auditing is highly acclaimed as the most important part of the financial 
 
1  Auditor-General Consolidated General Report on the Local Government Audit Outcomes: MFMA 2017/18 
(2019) 11. 
2  S 40(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
3  Steytler N ‘Local Government in South Africa: Entrenching Decentralisated Government’ in Steytler N (ed) 
The Place and Role of Local Government in Federal Systems (2005) 204. S 40(1) Constitution. 
4  Ntliziywana P ‘Municipal Financial Misconduct Regulations: The Draft’ (2012) 14(3) Local Government 
Bulletin 12-15.  
5  Ss 40 & 41 Constitution. See also Steytler (2005) 6. 
6  O’Regan K ‘Checks and balances: Reflections on the development of the doctrine of separation of powers under 
the South African Constitution’ (2005) 8 PELJ 124. See also De Visser J & November J ‘Overseeing the 
overseers: assessing compliance with municipal intervention rules in South Africa’ (2017) 9 Hague Journal of 
the Rule of Law 109-110; Steytler N ‘The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Reinforcing an hourglass system 
of multi-level government’ in Aroney N & Kincaid J (eds) Courts in Federal Countries Federalists or 
Unitarists? (2017) 338.  
7  Craig SE An Exploration of the Relationship between Municipal Audit Outcomes and Levels of Service Delivery 
in South African Local Government (unpublished Master mini-thesis, UCT, 2017) 2. 
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structure within public sector.8 The position is well-documented on its potential to combat 
corruption, thus fostering efficient financial management,9 which is key in the realisation of 
the developmental mandate which is particularly entrusted upon municipalities.10 It is for that 
reason, apart from strengthening constitutional democracy, that the Constitution established 
the Auditor-General as the Supreme Audit Institution.11   
The functions of the Auditor-General are outlined in section 188(1) of the Constitution, which 
include auditing and reporting on the accounts, financial statements and financial management 
of, among other institutions, all municipalities. The audit practice follows the globally observed 
trend and a distinctive principle of public administration that all government institutions ought 
to be audited by an independent body in order to strengthen democracy, promote accountability 
and foster responsiveness.12 The national legislation is in place to regulate this practice by 
enumerating further on the operations of the Auditor-General.13 
Similarly, municipalities are equally the important institutions entrusted with the 
developmental mandate which transcends a mere service delivery and are ‘regarded as the 
government closest to the people.’14 They are responsible for the implementation of the 
national policies,15 alongside the provision of basic services to the local citizenry.16 Given this 
 
8  Ngoepe M & Ngulube P ‘Contribution of record-keeping to audit opinions: an informetrics analysis of the 
General Reports on Audit Outcomes of the Auditor-General of South Africa’ (2013) 32 ESARBICA Journal 53. 
See also Hussain Z Effectiveness of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh in 
ensuring Accountability of Auditee Organizations: A Case Study of an MTBF Ministry (unpublished Masters 
thesis, North South University, 2011) 1. 
9  Dye K & Stapenhurst R Pillars of Integrity: The Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption (1998) 25. 
See also Korje BG ‘Assessment of implementation of audit recommendations in public sectors in Oromia 
Regional Government Public Institutions (2003-2006)’ (2016) 4/2 International Journal of Business & 
Management 23. 
10  Fuo O ‘Intrusion into the autonomy of South African local government: Advancing the minority judgment in 
the Merafong City case’ (2017) De Jure 325. See also Koma SB ‘Developmental local government: issues, 
trends and options in South Africa’ (2012) 5 African Journal of Public Affairs 105-116.  
11  S 1 Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 (PAA) defines `the supreme audit institution' as `the institution which, however 
designated, constituted or organized, exercises by virtue of the law of a country, the highest public auditing 
function of that country'. 
12  Van der Waldt G Managing for Excellence in the Public Sector 3 ed (2016) 163. 
13  The PAA read with the Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 2018 (PAAA).   
14  Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 2000 
(1) SA 661 (CC). See also De Visser J ‘Developmental local government in South Africa: institutional fault 
lines’ (2009) 2 Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 11; Thornhill C ‘The transformed local 
government system: some lessons’ (2008) 43 JOPA 492 & Fuo O Local Government’s Role in the Pursuit of 
the Transformative Constitutional Mandate of Social Justice in South Africa (unpublished LLD thesis, NWU, 
2014) 82-84. 
15  Steytler (2005) 201.  
16  Tau SF IDP as an implementation vehicle for service delivery for local government in South Africa (2013) 186.   
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important role, there is a clear need for an improved system of financial management to ensure 
the sustainability of municipalities. However, contemporary trends show that most 
municipalities are close to financial and operational collapse due to financial mismanagement 
and corruption.17 This is a serious problem calling for both short and long term solutions.  
Accordingly, there is a need to evaluate the legal framework governing the Auditor-General, 
particularly the institutional powers. The obvious significance of this evaluation lies with its 
potential to provide solutions to the financial collapse across municipalities by gauging whether 
the Auditor-General’s powers are structured for success. This has for several years remained 
topical and has now crystallised into academic debate. Although the opinion is divided in this 
regard, of common ground is that the Auditor-General is faced with several challenges that are 
inimical to its oversight function.18 The challenges are operational and systematic in nature. 
Standing out among these challenges is the practical inadequacy in the institutional powers to 
enforce compliance with audit recommendations against defaulting municipalities. This 
problem is evidenced by the recent municipal audit outcomes,19 and is further emphasised by 
Ijeoma.20  
Compliance with audit recommendations is important for good financial performance in 
municipalities.21 These recommendations are useful yardsticks of improvement since they 
identify specific aspects within the broader municipal financial systems that need performance 
augmentation.22 Chandler describes audit recommendations as ‘courses of action suggested by 
the auditor … to address the condition or adverse audit finding.’23 Given that, their 
 
17  Mathiba G ‘Time to clean out the Augean Stables of local government’ (2019) available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-05-28-time-to-clean-out-the-augean-stables-of-local-
government/ (accessed 20 June 2019).  
18  Munzhedzi PH ‘Fostering public accountability in South Africa: A reflection on challenges and successes’ 
(2016) 12 Journal for Transdiciplinary Research in Southern Africa 4; Mashamaite MM Improving 
Accountability in South African Local Government: Elements for Effective Local Government Accountability 
(2013) 94; Sibanda MM ‘Control, ethics and accountability in the financial management performance of 
Eastern Cape municipalities’ (2017) 52 JOPA 329; Zybrands W A Perspective on Local Government in South 
Africa (1995) ch 1; Ntonzima L ‘Public financial controls: can South African municipalities improve?’ (2011) 
43 JOPA 1010-11.  
19  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 16. 
20  Ijeoma E South Africa’s Public Administration in Context (2013) 174 & 201.  
21  Sibanda (2017) 314. 
22  Powell DM, O’Donovan M, Ayele Z & Chigwata T ‘Operation Clean Audit 2014: Why it failed and what can 
be learned’ available at https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/acsl/operation-clean-audit-2014 (accessed 20 June 
2019) 2. 
23  Chandler RA ‘Judicial views on Auditing from the Nineteenth Century’ (1997) 2(1) Accounting History 61-
80.  
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implementation by municipalities bears great potential to enhance good governance and 
facilitate the desired outcome of improved financial accountability.24  
In June 2019, the Auditor-General released the audit report for the 2017/18 financial year and 
it presents a very bleak picture of the municipalities’ financial affairs. The majority of 
municipalities are grappling with poor financial management practices, system regressions in 
accountability,25 and an overall operational collapse.26 The North West tops the list and is 
getting worse each year since 2012/13 financial year.27 Strikingly, no municipality in the North 
West has ever obtained an unqualified financial audit (not even to mention a clean audit) since 
the emergence of local government in 2000.28 This trend is attributable to several factors 
including irregular expenditure, non-compliance with legislative framework, ineffective 
provincial supervision,29 weak internal controls, fraud and corruption, as well as lack of skilled 
personnel in key areas of finance, performance and internal audit.30  
The Auditor-General provides the annual audit reports with extensive recommendations to 
municipal councils, provincial executive and the National Treasury (NT). However, these audit 
recommendations are often blatantly ignored in municipalities. This problem has been existent 
over the years and it is exacerbated by the Auditor-General’s lack of enforcement capacity.31 
The special case in point is the Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 2018 (PAAA) which 
introduced new enforcement powers of the Auditor-General. These powers, at a face value, are 
touted to be progressive measures to translate the current deficient role of the Auditor-General 
into a more effective one. The study doubts this narrative and an argument will be advanced 
against it later. The powers include, first, the issuance of a certificate of debt against an errant 
official to recover the financial loss suffered by the municipality. Secondly, the power to make 
binding remedial action for non-compliance and lastly, the referral of material irregularities to 
 
24  Nsingo S ‘Role players in public financial management’ in Moeti KB (ed) Public Finance Fundamentals 
(2014) 50. See also Aikins SK ‘Determinants of auditee adoption of audit recommendations: local government 
auditor’s perspectives’ (2012) 24 Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 195-220.   
25  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 8-9.  
26  CoGTA Local Government Anti-corruption Strategy (2015) 10.  
27  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 11.  
28  Greffrath W & Van der Waldt ‘Section 139 interventions in South African local government 1994-2015’ (2016) 
75 New Contree Journal 138.  
29  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 2-3. 
30  Woods G & Mantzaris EA The Anti-Corruption Reader (2012) 137. 
31  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 9. See also Van der Walt G, Van Niekerk D & Doyle M, Knipe A 
& Du Toit D Managing for Results in Government (2002) 173. 
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the relevant public investigating bodies.32 However, the Act fails to provide precise stipulations 
and practical insights for the effective operationalisation of these powers.   
It is against this background that this study problematizes the issue of non-implementation of 
audit recommendations in municipalities, particularly in the North West. The exploration of 
this problem is timely and cannot be overemphasised any further than is already emphasised 
by the Auditor-General.33  
1.2.  Research question 
1.2.1. Overarching research question  
The overarching question of the study is: ‘How can the Auditor-General’s recommendations 
be better and adequately given effect in the North West municipalities (thus dealing with 
dysfunctionality and poor financial performance)?’ 
1.2.2. Ancillary research questions  
In response to the overarching question, the following ancillary questions are pertinent:  
1. What is the role of the Auditor-General? 
2. How do municipalities implement audit recommendations?  
3. How can and does the Auditor-General enforce implementation of its recommendations 
against municipalities? 
4. How can and does the provincial government implement audit recommendations in 
municipalities?  
5. How can and does the national government implement audit recommendations in 
municipalities? 
6. Is the current legal framework and other measures for the implementation of audit 
recommendations adequate to extract the most benefit of their desired intent? 
These questions will be answered in respect of the North West Province due to its long history 
of dysfunctionality and financial maladministration across its municipalities.34 To 
 
32  S 4 PAAA.  
33  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 9. See also Munzhedzi PH ‘The national government’s intervention 
in the provincial government: A case of Limpopo’ (2014) 5 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 701. See 
also Kraai S, Holtzhausen N & Malan L ‘Oversight Mechanisms in Local Government: A Case of Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa’ (2017) 9(6) African Journal of Public Affairs 59-63.  
34  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 11. See also Molepo M ‘North West Local Municipalities on their 
Knees’ Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2019) available at 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/news/north-west-local-municipalities-their-knees (accessed 30 August 2019). 
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contextualise the problem, three municipalities (Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and Tswaing) will be 
adopted as case studies. The justification for selecting these municipalities is threefold. First, 
they have never received clean or unqualified audit since 2000.35 Secondly, at the time of 
writing, they were under section 139(1) intervention due to financial and operational collapse.36 
Lastly, they have been, and some are still, experiencing violent service delivery protests.  
1.3.  Argument 
The study argues that the role of the Auditor-General is important in the promotion of good 
governance and efficient financial management in municipalities.37 It is further argued that the 
Auditor-General’s role should not end at making audit recommendations, but should extend 
further to ensure the eventual implementation of those recommendations by municipalities. 
The absence of enforcement powers is perhaps what led Murray to conclude, quite correctly, 
that ‘the force of the Auditor-General as an institution … lies in influence [and] not in formal 
power’.38  
It is further argued that the municipal councils are responsible for the implementation of audit 
recommendations in municipalities and that they often fail in this regard. It is believed that this 
failure can be addressed if all the involved role-players could have some regard for their duties. 
These include the Mayor, the administration (MM, CFO, and internal audit units), the Audit 
Committees and the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC).   
It is also argued that municipalities can be able to effectively implement the audit 
recommendations if there are strong supervisory measures from the provincial and national 
governments. However, it will be demonstrated that the provincial and national governments 
provide ineffective supervision over municipalities, with the negative impact of financial and 
operational collapse.39     
Further argument is that the efforts undertaken to reconstitute and strengthen the legal 
framework governing the Auditor-General (the 2018 amendments to the Public Audit Act) do 
not constitute a silver bullet solution to the financial and systematic challenges in 
municipalities. Instead, strong collaborations with other institutions should be fostered to make 
 
35  Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 138.   
36  S 139(5) Constitution.  
37  Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26 para 160. 
38  Murray C ‘The Human Rights Commission et al: What is the Role of South Africa's Chapter 9 Institutions?’ 
(2006) 9(2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 132. 
39  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019).   
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the Auditor-General’s role more effective. These institutions include, among others, the Public 
Protector (PP), South African Police Service (SAPS), Special Investigation Unit (SIU) and 
civil society organisations (CSOs).  
Lastly, it is argued that efficient financial management practices are important in achieving the 
long-term sustainability of municipalities since they complement accountability and 
transparency. In turn, weak and opaque financial management results in the misuse of 
municipal resources, thus leading to dysfunctionality and corruption. 
1.4.  Literature review 
There is wealth of literature on the institutional operations, weaknesses and strengths of the 
Auditor-General,40 and its correlation with the New Public Management (NPM) framework,41 
public accountability,42 good governance and anti-corruption regime in public sector is well-
established, explored from different perspectives. Similarly, literature on efficient financial 
management systems in the field of public administration abound. However, this is often not 
explored in relation to the Auditor-General, particularly from legal and policy perspective. This 
is so, in part, because of the paucity of attention to the changing dimensions on the current legal 
framework on the role and enforcement powers of the Auditor-General.43  
The Auditor-General is undoubtedly one of the most important institutions for ensuring public 
accountability and good governance. As the name suggests, its primary mandate is to audit the 
financial statements and accounts of all state departments and institutions.44 Ngoepe and 
Ngulube posit that the Auditor-General is the major role-player in safeguarding effective 
oversight, transparency, accountability and good governance.45 Similarly, Norgen describes the 
Auditor-General as a ‘watchdog agency’ that constantly gauges and oversees financial 
performance in the public sector for more accountability and openness.46 On a cautious note, 
 
40  Masipa TS The Nexus between Government Effectiveness and Corruption in South Africa (2016) 23-38.  
41  Ntliziywana P The Transformation of Local Government Service Delivery in South Africa: The Failures and 
Limits of Legislating New Public Management (unpublished PhD thesis, UWC, 2017) ch 1. See also Steytler 
N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) ch 7 & 11.  
42  De Visser J ‘Performance management in the Systems Act: Implementing accountability’ (2001) 3 Local 
Government Bulletin 7.  
43  Ramkumar V & Krafchik W ‘The role of civil society organizations in auditing and public finance 
management’ (2005) available at https://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Role-of-Civil-
Society-Organizations-in-Auditing-and-Public-Finance-Management1.pdf  (accessed 18 June 2019).   
44  S 188(1) Constitution.  
45  Ngoepe & Ngulube (2013) 53. 
46  Norgen C ‘The world needs International Audit Standards’ (2010) 37(1) International Journal of Government 
Auditors 10.  
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Kayrack indicates that the Auditor-General can only achieve these aspirations if it is 
independent.47   
Mashamaite and Moloto contend that the role of the Auditor-General is ineffective since there 
is lack of political will by public servants to implement his recommendations, and there is 
nothing he can do about it.48 However, what Mashamaite and Moloto fail to do is to suggest a 
potential solution to deal with this problem. Commendably, Masood and Lodhi suggest that 
the establishment of a proper follow-up system can be one of the measures to address the 
problem of non-implementation of audit recommendations.49 However, these two scholars have 
explored the problem in respect of internal audit recommendations in Pakistan, while this study 
explores it in respect of external audit recommendations in South African municipalities.     
The deficient role of the Auditor-General is also signalled by the appalling state of financial 
affairs and recurring faults across municipalities.50 Ntonzima offers an instructive perspective 
and argues that this crisis calls ‘for tough interventions.’51 Without explaining what he means 
by ‘tough interventions’, Ntonzima concludes by recommending that a new design of standard 
financial systems should be established and that political interference with administration 
should be avoided. The author does not necessarily address the inefficiencies of the Auditor-
General, despite having raised it as one of the root causes. Munzhedzi writes that inappropriate 
procurement practices, inadequate financial skills and the lack of commitment towards good 
governance by municipal officials are exacerbating the poor state of financial affairs across 
municipalities.52     
In the book entitled The Management of Public Finance, Visser and Erasmus emphasise the 
efficiency of the Auditor-General in securing good financial performance and accountability.53 
In more precise terms, Hussain establishes the relationship between the Auditor-General and 
 
47  Kayrak M ‘Evolving challenges for supreme audit institutions in struggling with corruption’ (2008) 15/1 
Journal of Financial Crime 62. 
48  Mashamaite KA & Moloto KR Aligning Integrated Development Plan, Service Delivery and Budget 
Implementation Plan and Budgeting: An Attempt to Enforce Service Delivery Monitoring in South Africa’s 
Local Municipalities (2016) 121-32. 
49  Masood A & Lodhi RN ‘Factors Affecting the Success of Government Audits: A Case Study of Pakistan’ 
(2015) 3/2 Universal Journal of Management 59. 
50  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) executive summary.  
51  Ntonzima (2011) 1010.  
52  Munzhedzi PH Financial Viability of the South African Municipalities: Some Observations on Legal 
Compliance (2013) 282. 
53  Visser CB & Erasmus PW The Management of Public Finance (2002) 7.  
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municipalities and writes that the former constitute a sine qua non for accountability and 
efficient financial management on the daily affairs of the latter.54 Mashamaite holds a contrary 
view and argues that the Auditor-General is an office rendered ineffective since it cannot take 
any action towards enforcing compliance with its recommendations and for that, she describes 
the institution as having ‘no teeth to bite’.55 Mafunisa concurs and points out that even if the 
Auditor-General can have the enforcement powers, non-compliance will remain as an issue 
given the prevailing political environment of impunity.56  
Nzewi and Musokeru examined the factors impeding the efficiency of Auditor-General, albeit 
with focus on the provinces.57 The authors categorise these factors into political, institutional 
and technical. Among others, they cite two main challenges, first, the lack of sufficient 
authority and resources to enforce compliance with audit recommendations.58 Secondly, non-
compliance with key policy and legal provisions.59 They conclude with few suggestions that 
the Auditor-General should foster good relations and collaboration with other agencies, as well 
as the imposition of punitive measures on the failing institutions and individual public officials. 
However, their recommendations are not devised to suit local government context.   
Writing on the factors that are inimical to good financial management and accountability in the 
broader public sector, Tsheletsane and Fourie observe that the ‘high turnover rate of accounting 
officers and of parliamentary committees such as the Standing Committee on Public Accounts’ 
(SCOPA) and a lack of political will are the long ignored problems exacerbating accountability 
regressions in local government.60 Kraai and Holtzhausen share the same sentiments.61 
However, despite their broad inquiry, the non-implementation of audit recommendations is not 
mentioned as one of those factors, and thus no solution is proffered in that regard.  
The question as to which role the provincial government can play in ensuring that 
municipalities implement audit recommendations is worth being explored too. In this regard, 
 
54  Hussain (2011) ch 1. 
55  Mashamaite (2013) 95. 
56  See generally Mafunisa MJ Enhancing Accountability and Ethics in the Public Services: The case of the 
Republic of South Africa (1997).  
57  Nzewi O & Musokeru P ‘A critical review of the oversight role of the Office of the Auditor-General in financial 
accountability’ (2014) 2 Africa’s Public Service Delivery & Performance Review 36. 
58  Nzewi & Musokeru (2014) 44. 
59  Nzewi & Musokeru (2014) 48. 
60  Tsheletsane I & Fourie D ‘Factors hindering public financial management and accountability in South Africa’ 
(2014) 7 African Journal of Public Affairs 42-56.  
61  Kraai, Holtzhausen & Malan (2017) 59-63.  
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Steytler and De Visser state that the supervision by provincial government over municipalities 
is an important constitutional design feature which ensures, among other things, viable and 
sustainable municipal financial management.62 However, Khumalo, Dawood and Mahabir 
seem to be viewing the provincial supervision over municipalities as a failing mechanism.63 
The framework on monitoring, support and intervention by the provinces on the financial 
affairs of municipalities, they argue, ‘has not been very successful thus far’ and that there is no 
improvement, given poor financial performance across municipalities.64  
The 2017/18 audit report by the Auditor-General also attests to this view and observes that the 
provincial role players are not sufficiently supporting municipalities much as they are supposed 
to be doing to achieve efficient financial management.65 In proposing a way forward, 
Mathenjwa writes that the provincial role players must observe the legal requirements for the 
intervention and support in municipalities.66 He argues that such observance will foster 
development, mutual trust, goodwill and good municipal financial management. However, the 
author’s proposal is bit of a misnomer since there is no legislation regulating interventions as 
envisaged in section 139(8) of the Constitution. 
A 2017 study by Craig attempts to establish the relationship between municipal audit outcomes 
and service delivery.67 The author concludes that indeed there is a positive, but weak, 
relationship between these two variables. The study also observes that the country’s one-size-
fits-all auditing standards seem incongruous.68 However, like Tsheletsane and Fourie, Craig’s 
study pays little attention to the role of the Auditor-General in fostering good municipal 
financial management. The same can also be said in respect of Motubatse who explores the 
factors affecting progress towards achieving clean audits in municipalities,69 without 
identifying the deficient aspects and potential challenges on the role of the Auditor-General, 
including the non-implementation of audit recommendations. 
 
62  Steytler & De Visser (2007) ch 15. 
63  See generally Khumalo B, Dawood G & Mahabir J ‘South Africa’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations System’ 
in Ghai Y & Steytler N (eds) Kenya-South Africa Dialogue on Devolution (2016).  
64  Khumalo, Dawood & Mahabir (2016) 222.  
65  Consolidated Audit Report 2016/17 (2017) 3.  
66  Mathenjwa M ‘Contemporary trends in provincial government supervision of local government in South 
Africa’ (2014) 18 Law, Democracy & Development 200. 
67  Craig (2017) 2-4.  
68  Craig (2017) 129. 
69  Motubatse KN An Evaluation of Factors Affecting the Progression to Clean Audit Outcomes in South African 
Municipalities (unpublished PhD thesis, UL, 2016) ch 1.  
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Pointing back to Craig’s argument, Ledger contends that the relationship between municipal 
financial management and service delivery ‘is not simply causal’, and terms it a ‘very serious 
error’ to perceive the relationship as such.70 However, this study argues that there is a direct 
and complementary linkage between efficient municipal financial management and service 
delivery. The more efficient the municipality is in terms of managing its finances, the greater 
potential it has to achieve sustainable service delivery. Powell and others share the same 
sentiment.71 Reverse is also true, in that poor financial management extremely hampers 
municipality’s efficiency to provide services, as is currently shown in the 2017/18 audit report.  
Similarly, Craig asserts that good financial management is not sufficient to assist municipalities 
to improve their performance and that financial compliance, as emphasised by the Auditor-
General, might not be ‘the most helpful approach in terms of improving municipal [financial] 
performance’.72 This reading cannot be supported based on two grounds. First, the author is 
second-guessing and oversimplifying the role and significance of the Auditor-General, which 
is the bedrock institution supporting the country’s democratic architecture through 
accountability promotion. Secondly, the author’s assertion is unheeding to the very basic logic 
that no performance improvement can be recorded without compliance with the relevant laws, 
regulations and policies.  
In a more general approach, with minimal focus on the Auditor-General, Bekink, in his LLD 
thesis entitled The Restructuring (Systemization) of Local Government under the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, gives a wide account of the new system of local 
government and dedicates a chapter to discuss the aspects relating to municipal financial and 
fiscal management.73 However, nowhere in the chapter the author turns his focus to deal with 
the non-implementation of audit recommendations, the Achilles heel of municipal financial 
systems. What the author simply does, instead, is to regurgitate the legislative provisions 
regarding the role of the Auditor-General in municipal finance audit process,74 without proper 
 
70  Ledger T ‘Municipal audit outcomes – looking for Solutions in all the wrong places’ (2016) available at 
http://pari.org.za/news-and-posts/municipal-audit-outcomes-looking-solutions-wrong-places/ (accessed 18 
June 2019). The author is wrong on this point.  
71  Powell, O’Donovan & Ayele et al (2014) 1-2.  
72  Craig (2017) 128. 
73  Bekink B The Restructuring (Systemization) of Local Government under the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (unpublished LLD thesis, UP, 2006) ch 18.  
74  Bekink (2006) 494, 514, 531. 
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contextualisation of those provisions and most importantly, without giving an indication on 
whether they are effective or not and if they are, to what extent.    
The same can be said with Ntliziywana who, in his PhD thesis entitled The Transformation of 
Local Government Service Delivery in South Africa: The Failures and Limits of Legislating 
New Public Management, explores the factors that occasioned the system failure on the 
implementation of the NPM model for effective service delivery by South African 
municipalities.75 Whereas the author strongly argues for an improved financial management 
systems across municipalities, with the Auditor-General having a significant role to play in that 
regard,76 like Bekink, Ntliziywana does not comment on how exactly can the role of the 
Auditor-General be revised for more efficiency to achieve improved financial management 
systems in municipalities.   
In the PhD study entitled The Role of the Office of the Auditor General of South Africa in 
Enhancing Sound Public Financial Management, with Special Reference to the Eastern Cape 
Province, Deliwe does more or less the same as what the present study intends to do, albeit 
with broadened focus.77 Deliwe explores alternative ways through which the Auditor-General 
could be made more effective in acting against poor audit outcomes and recurring audit 
findings across the provinces. The author also asks more or less the same question as this 
research study, namely; what is the role of the Auditor-General and to what extent can it assists 
in enhancing improved systems of financial management within the broader public sector in 
South Africa? Deliwe’s study finds that strong collaborations between the Auditor-General and 
the Parliament are necessary for the attainment of good financial performance across provincial 
governments.78  
However, there are four main aspects that set the present study more distinctive from that of 
Deliwe. First, sight should not be lost of the fact that this study engages the subject from the 
perspective of local government, while Deliwe’s study looked mainly at provincial 
government, albeit with limited focus on the Eastern Cape, and intermittently at national 
government. It did not deal with the role of the Auditor-General in relation to municipalities 
 
75  Ntliziywana (2017) ch 2.  
76  Ntliziywana (2017) 2-3. 
77  Deliwe MCC The Role of the Office of the Auditor General of South Africa in Enhancing Sound Public 
Financial Management, with Special Reference to the Eastern Cape Province (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Fort Hare, 2016).  
78  Deliwe (2016) 244.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
13 
 
nor did it even attempt to address its potential challenges at that level. Secondly, whereas 
Deliwe’s study recommends the formation of strong collaborations between the Parliament and 
the Auditor-General, there is no clear guidance on how exactly those collaborations will be 
realised in practical terms. Moreover, the author falls short of innovation to suggest other 
relevant institutions and bodies, besides the Parliament, that the Auditor-General can 
collaborate with for more efficiency. Thirdly, whereas Deliwe problematised the non-
implementation of audit recommendations in provinces, surprisingly, little evidence is 
proffered of ‘everything imaginable’79 that the Auditor-General did to foster compliance with 
audit recommendations. Lastly, Deliwe’s suggestions on how the audit recommendations can 
be given effect in provinces are not clear as they should on responsibility division, that is, the 
question on who does what and when is disappointingly abandoned by the author.    
Though Bahtiri raises almost the same problem that the current study has identified, the author 
does not adequately contextualise it in a municipality setup.80 The same can be said about 
Hussain, who evaluates the role of the Auditor-General in the broadest of terms, covering the 
private sector as well.81    
1.5.  Significance of the study 
From the preceding survey of literature, it is safe to say that there is no scholarly work that has 
specifically explore the question that this study puts forth and seeks to pursue, namely; how 
can the Auditor-General’s recommendations be better and adequately given effect in the North 
West municipalities? As has been demonstrated, most scholars involved in the debate around 
this subject are from public administration discipline. For that reason, their deliberations lack 
a sense of clarity from the legal perspective which this study presents. Thus, the study finds its 
relevancy in exploring the question on whether the current legal framework underpinning the 
role and powers of the Auditor-General impedes or facilitate the effective implementation of 
audit recommendations in municipalities, in order to achieve efficient financial management. 
Put differently, whether the legal framework governing the Auditor-General provides an 
enabling environment for the implementation of audit recommendations in municipalities.  
This inquiry is timely in that it is undertaken in the wake of the 2017/18 deteriorating local 
government audit outcomes. The context of the study is the North West Province.  
 
79  Deliwe (2016) 239.  
80  Bahtiri L Issue of Non-Addressed Recommendations from the Auditor General in Kosovo (unpublished thesis, 
American University in Kosovo, 2015) ch 1.  
81  Hussain (2011) ch 1.  
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1.6.  Research methodology 
The study employed a desktop and library-based research method. The literature review 
included both primary and secondary sources that are relevant to the subject-matter of the 
study. In the main, the primary sources included the Constitution, Acts of Parliament, policies, 
case law, municipalities’ operational reports and the Auditor-General’s annual reports on local 
government audit outcomes. The secondary sources relied upon included textbooks, journal 
articles, newspaper articles, working papers, conference papers and relevant verifiable internet 
sources.   
1.7. Overview of chapters 
This study is presented in six chapters, outlined in the sequential order below: 
Chapter one introduces the study, outlines the problem statement, poses the research question, 
presents the preliminary argument, literature review, explains the rationale/significance for 
undertaking the study, methodological approach and maps the structure of the study.   
Chapter two discusses the role of the Auditor-General with reference to the constitutional and 
legislative framework. It commences with a brief historical context of the institution and 
concludes with a discussion on different audit opinions and key aspects that the Auditor-
General considers when auditing.  
Chapter three looks into how the audit recommendations are implemented in municipalities. 
It outlines the legal duties imposed on various municipal actors, provincial and national 
governments’ role-players insofar as the implementation of audit recommendations is 
concerned. It also discusses the roles of other institutions that may also come in handy in 
ensuring the implementation of audit recommendations. These institutions include the Auditor-
General, the Public Protector (PP), the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Hawks, the 
Special Investigation Unit (SIU) and civil society organisations.   
Chapter four adopts three case study municipalities in the North West Province in order to 
provide a practical dimension in respect of the framework outlined in chapter three. It 
commences by sketching a general state of affairs in the province and its history of financial 
mismanagement across the municipalities. The chapter also reflects on the supervisory 
measures taken by the province to address the challenges faced by its municipalities. Upon the 
end, flowing from the case studies, the chapter then identifies and summarises the emerging 
trends and problems facing municipalities in the province. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Chapter five draws from the trends and key issues emerging from chapter four and evaluate 
the suitability of legal measures and non-legal factors in relation to the implementation of audit 
recommendations in municipalities. The expanded powers of the Auditor-General are closely 
analysed in this chapter.  
Chapter six provides an overall conclusion, present key findings, offers recommendations and 
make suggestions for future research agenda.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL 
 2.1. Introduction    
The Constitution makes salient provision for the establishment of six state institutions entrusted 
with the common responsibility of supporting constitutional democracy.82 The nub of this 
provision encompasses the need ‘to provide a check on government’,83 thus reinforcing good 
governance, accountability,84 transparency and proper stewardship of public resources.85 The 
Auditor-General is fittingly one of these institutions and its contribution to the common 
responsibility takes the form of routine auditing and reporting on the accounts and financial 
affairs of government departments, institutions and municipalities.86 The survey of literature 
affirms that auditing is the most universally utilised mechanism to foster the answerability of 
governments to the citizenry. This is perhaps what led Murray to conclude that ‘the Auditor-
General is the most powerful of the Chapter 9s’.87 The Constitution and the relevant national 
legislation provide a firm basis for the institution of the Auditor-General, defines its role and 
demarcates the contours within which it must operate.  
On that basis, this chapter seeks to ascertain the Auditor-General’s role from the perspective 
of local government. Before this can be done, a brief historical account is necessary, about the 
institutional evolution of the Auditor-General. It then proceeds to explore the legislative 
framework governing the institution. Afterwards, key components of audit reports and the 
numerous standard audit outcomes that the Auditor-General can give are discussed.   
 2.2. The historical context of the institution of the Auditor-General 
The institution of the Auditor-General is not of recent origin. Its earliest history can be traced 
back to the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 through proclamation by the 
South Africa Act 1 of 1909, bringing into one entity four British colonies – Transvaal, Natal, 
Orange River and Cape of Good Hope.88 Section 132 of the South Africa Act provided that the 
‘Governor-General in Council shall appoint …[an] Auditor-General who shall hold office 
 
82  Chapter 9 Constitution.  
83  Murray (2006) 126. 
84  Rail Commuter Action Group & Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail & Others 2005 (2) SA 35 (CC) para 72. 
85  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) 
paras 133-134. 
86  S 188(1) Constitution.  
87  Murray (2006) 133.  
88  AGSA 100 Years of Legacy and Legends (2014) 12.  
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during good behaviour …’ In addition, the Exchequer and Audit Act 21 of 1911 was then 
adopted as a frame of reference to guide auditing processes across all the provinces.89 This Act 
was amended in 1916 and remained unchanged until the adoption of the new Exchequer and 
Audit Act 32 of 1956.90 However, the major shortcoming of the 1956 Act is that it subordinated 
and subsumed the Auditor-General under the ministerial supervision of the Treasury. The 
obvious threat this arrangement gave rise to was that it had the potential to undermine the 
much-needed independence of the institution. In 1992, the Auditor-General Amendment Act 
123 of 1992 was passed, which granted the Auditor-General full independence from the 
Treasury, with the requisite autonomy to execute its mandate fully without favour or 
prejudice.91 
In 1975, the concept of performance auditing was introduced and incorporated as part of the 
Auditor-General’s mandate within the broader auditing framework.92 This development, 
alongside other significant reforms dating from 1909, was informed by ‘the systems, customs 
and traditions of the Dutch and British colonial powers’.93 From its conception, the role of the 
Auditor-General consistently entailed performance evaluation, transaction’s verification, 
reporting on and examination of public accounts. The centennial review of the Auditor-General 
summarises its role as follows:  
[The Auditor-General] had to ‘compare the entries in the cash-book or account with the 
supporting vouchers and documents and the bank pass-book’. In doing so, he had to check 
that vouchers corresponded to receipts for payment and that the sums on both were the same. 
He had to make sure that all the calculations were accurate and had been authorised by the 
responsible officer and that all relevant regulations had been observed.94 
Navigating the tricky path towards the new and democratic South Africa, it was inevitable to 
have, as part of the negotiations between the apartheid government and the African National 
Congress (ANC), the continued existence of the Auditor-General post-1994.95 These 
 
89  AGSA (2014) 13. 
90  UN Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC) ‘South Africa Office of the Auditor-General’ (2016) available at 
http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/South%20Africa/Authorities/South%20Africa%20
Authorities.pdf  (accessed 12 August 2019).  
91  Nzewi & Musokeru (2014) 38. 
92  Chap IV Exchequer & Audit Act 66 of 1975.  
93  AGSA (2014) 10.  
94  AGSA (2014) 19.  
95  Murray (2006) 123. See also Nzewi & Musokeru (2014) 38.  
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negotiations yielded far-reaching changes and developments not only regarding the Auditor-
General as an institution, but also the entire realm of government in South Africa. Among other 
momentous shifts in policy, the amalgamation of the then TBVC states (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) is worth mentioning. Each of these states had independent 
status and of course their own Auditor-Generals.96  
Following the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, all the pre-1994 Auditor-General offices of 
the TBVC states were incorporated into one Auditor-General of South Africa, appointed,97 on 
the recommendation of the National Assembly, by the President.98 This state reorganisation 
heralded what Woods describes as ‘a revolution within the South African public sector’.99 The 
aftermath of this revolution is still being felt today. In local government space particularly, this 
revolution culminated in the promulgation of the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 
2003 (MFMA), the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (MSA) and the Public Audit Act 25 of 
2004 (PAA) – as amended in 2018.100  
 2.3. The constitutional and legislative framework  
Great strides have been made by the Parliament of South Africa, through the promulgation of 
various pieces of legislation, in ensuring that the role and position of the Auditor-General 
within the entire system of constitutional democracy is precisely defined. A strong legal and 
policy framework on the role of the Auditor-General, as correctly argued by Mathebula, is an 
important precursor towards extracting the most benefit from its desired outcome.101 The 
desired outcome in this regard is the achievement of sound and sustainable management of the 
fiscal and financial affairs of the public sector.102 In that light, this section outlines the 
legislative framework underpinning the role and position of the Auditor-General as it relates to 
municipalities.  
 
96  AGSA (2014) 40. 
97  Any person who wants to be appointed as the Auditor-General has to be a ‘South African citizen and a fit and 
proper person’. He or she also has to have a specialised knowledge or experience in auditing, state finances 
and public administration. See s 193(3) Constitution.  
98  S 193(4) Constitution. See also AGSA (2014) 40.   
99  AGSA (2014) 9.  
100  PAAA.  
101 Mathebula NE Audit Outcomes and their role in Clean Administration in Municipalities within Limpopo 
Province, South Africa: A Deterrence Theory Approach (2016) 215.  
102  Mathebula (2016) 215.  
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2.3.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The Constitution, as the supreme law,103 establishes the Auditor-General as the Supreme Audit 
Institution of the country and provides the foundational framework within which it must 
operate. It further recognises and places great emphasis on the independence of this 
institution,104 stating that it must be impartial, exercise its powers and execute its functions 
without fear, favour or prejudice.105 Section 188(1) of the Constitution pronounces the 
functions of the Auditor-General as follows:  
The Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial 
management of –  
(a) all national and provincial state departments and administrations; 
(b) all municipalities; and 
(c) any other institution or accounting entity required by national or provincial legislation 
to be audited by the Auditor-General.       
There are other relevant constitutional provisions that must be read in tandem with section 
188(1). One of those provisions is section 215(1) which provides that the national, provincial 
and municipal budgets and budgetary processes ‘must promote transparency, accountability 
and the effective financial management of the economy, debt and the public sector’. This is 
followed by section 216(1) which requires national legislation to establish the NT and spell out 
measures to ensure transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government.106 The 
Constitution also empowers the NT to enforce compliance with measures put in place to ensure 
transparency and expenditure control across all organs of state by stopping the transfer of funds 
to any defaulting institution if a material breach of those measures persists.107 Also, the 
Auditor-General has a major role to play in this regard, and such role entails reporting on the 
state of finances in municipalities to Parliament before the NT can approve the stoppage of 
transfers.108  
 
103  S 2 Constitution.  
104  Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26; 
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 160, hereafter ‘First Certification case’. See also 
Woolman S & Schutte Y ‘Auditor-General’ in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (Service 3) 5–11 & New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others 
1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) paras 98-99. 
105  S 181(2) Constitution. 
106  S 216 Constitution. 
107  S 216(2) Constitution.  
108  S 216(5)(a) Constitution.  
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Section 153(a) of the Constitution requires municipalities to structure and manage their 
administration, budgeting and planning processes to prioritise the community’s basic needs 
and promote its social and economic development. The MFMA, together with the MSA, aims 
to regulate and ensure the implementation and facilitation of this constitutional duty by 
ensuring that the municipalities’ priorities, plans, budgets, reports and implementation actions 
are properly aligned. In facilitating and monitoring municipalities’ progress towards achieving 
this, the Auditor-General audits their performance, records and financial statements.109 
In essence, the purpose of auditing by the Auditor-General is to detect problems within the 
internal systems of municipalities. This takes place in various ways, such as scrutinising the 
financial records to ascertain whether they are free from material misstatements, reporting on 
the usefulness and veracity of the information provided for auditing by municipalities, 
reporting on material non-compliance with key legislation, predetermined objectives and 
identifying key internal control deficiencies.110 Where certain deficiencies have been 
identified, the Auditor-General provides audit recommendations requiring concrete actions 
from audited institutions to address and prevent identified issues from recurring. This is one of 
the reasons why the implementation of audit recommendations is essential in achieving sound 
fiscal and financial management in the public sector. Once the auditing process has been 
completed and reports compiled, the Auditor-General is constitutionally mandated to table 
annual audit reports in Parliament,111 reflecting the true state of the financial affairs of all 
municipalities.112 In this way, it is clear that the Auditor-General plays a significant role in 
reinforcing Parliament’s oversight function to foster accountability in local government and 
the public sector in general.  
2.3.2. Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 
The Auditor-General is not empowered only by the Constitution but has the additional powers 
and functions as prescribed in national legislation.113 The PAA is the national legislation 
envisaged in section 188(4) of the Constitution. Section 6 of the PAA delineates the 
requirements for the appointment of the Auditor-General and further outlines his or her 
 
109  S 188(2) Constitution.  
110  S 20 PAA. Mtwesi A ‘Fundamentals of Municipal Finances’ Helen Suzman Foundation (2015) available at 
https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/fundamentals-of-municipal-finances (accessed 14 August 2019).  
111  And the NT, provincial government and municipal council.  
112  NT Guidelines for Legislative Oversight through Annual Reports (2005) 18-20. 
113  S 188(4) Constitution.  
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additional functions,114 conditions of employment,115 and expanded mandate,116 while also 
promoting transparency and accountability in the operations of the institution itself by requiring 
the Auditor-General to report to the National Assembly on his or her affairs.117 Moreover, the 
PAA imitates the constitutional version on the role of the Auditor-General in letter and spirit. 
It reaffirms the independence of the Auditor-General as the Supreme Audit Institution of the 
country,118 and also ascertains the Auditor-General’s role just as it is in the Constitution.119 
The Auditor-General’s work is of such a nature that its eventual fulfilment depends largely on 
the cooperation of someone else, namely the authorised official or an employee of the auditee 
institution, who must provide the relevant information, records and documents for the purposes 
of auditing. In this way, the possibility exists that the Auditor-General might not get access to 
the necessary information (or if it does, it might be inadequate or inaccurate) due to several 
reasons, such as politically-inclined resistance or simply reluctance to cooperate, as is an 
emerging culture in most municipalities.120  
The PAA anticipates this potential hindrance and accordingly provides, in sections 15 and 16 
respectively, that the Auditor-General (or an authorised auditor designated by the Auditor-
General) must have at all reasonable times, within the scope of his or her work, full and 
unrestricted access to whatever he or she reasonably suspects will provide valuable information 
in the process of auditing and is being concealed from him or her. These powers include the 
interrogation of any person and the search of property, premises, vehicles or persons, as the 
case might be.121 Conspicuously, these powers resemble the ‘policeman theory’ which regards 
the Auditor-General as ‘a policeman whose role is to check the [arithmetic] accuracy of 
financial standings, for preventing and detecting frauds in an entity … through searching.’122    
The PAA has expanded the mandate of the Auditor-General to make it broader and more 
detailed than it is presented in the Constitution. Section 20 of the Act provides that: 
 
114  Ss 4 & 5 PAA. 
115  S 7 PAA. 
116  S 20(2) PAA. 
117  S 10(1) PAA. 
118  S 3(a);(c) PAA.  
119  S 4(1) PAA.  
120  For instance, the Auditor-General reported instances of threats, resistance and intimidation at Ditsobotla 
municipality, see AGSA Citizens Report: MFMA 2017/18 (2019) 15 & 20.  
121  S 15 read with s 16 PAA.   
122  Hayes RS, Schilder A, Dassen R et al Principles of Auditing: An International Perspective (1999) 12.  
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(1) The Auditor-General must in respect of each audit referred to in section 11 prepare a report 
on the audit. 
(2) An audit report must reflect such opinions and statements as may be required by any 
legislation applicable to the auditee which is the subject of the audit, but must reflect at least 
an opinion or conclusion on-  
(a) whether the annual financial statements of the auditee fairly present, in all material 
respects, the financial position at a specific date and results of its operations and cash 
flow for the period which ended on that date in accordance with the applicable 
financial framework and legislation; 
(b) the auditee’s compliance with any applicable legislation relating to financial matters, 
financial management and other related matters; and 
(c) the reported information relating to the performance of the auditee against 
predetermined objectives. 
Moreover, the PAA is the first legislation in the entire auditing framework to provide for the 
formal adoption of auditing standards and the minimum qualification criteria for external 
auditors. This heralded an immense step in the journey of standardising and professionalising 
the sector.123    
2.3.3. Public Audit Amendment Act 5 of 2018 
The PAAA amends certain provisions of the PAA. It also introduces new enforcement powers 
of the Auditor-General. These powers are, first, the power to refer suspected material 
irregularities arising from the auditing process to the relevant authorities with requisite 
investigative capacity and skills.124 Secondly, the power to follow-up on the progress made by 
the relevant accounting officer in implementing audit recommendations and to take appropriate 
remedial action if there is any failure in that regard.125 Lastly, the power to issue a certificate 
of debt against the accounting officer or accounting authority who failed to implement remedial 
actions.126 The Auditor-General believes that these ‘amendments to the PAA provide [him] 
with more powers to ensure accountability in the public sector’.127 However, given that these 
 
123  The International Standards on Auditing and Assurance Pronouncements issued by the International Auditing 
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) are applied 
in the annual audits.  
124  Such as the PP, the Hawks, SIU & others. 
125  S 5A(1);(2) PAAA. If there is financial loss, the accounting officer must recover it from the responsible person. 
126  S 5A PAAA.  
127  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 13. 
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powers have not yet been fully operationalised, it is quite early to leap that high in making this 
claim. The reverse can also be true, in practice.  
2.3.4. Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003  
The MFMA is the key driver of financial reforms in the sphere of local government. As its 
name suggests, it exists to regulate, promote and secure the sound and sustainable management 
of the fiscal and financial affairs of all municipalities and their entities. The Act achieves this 
objective by setting out the treasury norms and standards that must guide the financial affairs 
of municipalities. Generally, the Act provides guidance on:  
(a) ensuring transparency, accountability and appropriate lines of responsibility in the 
fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities; 
(b) the management of their revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities and the 
handling of their financial dealings; 
(c) budgetary and financial planning processes and the co-ordination of those processes 
with the processes of organs of state in other spheres of government; 
(d) borrowing;  
(e) the handling of financial problems in municipalities; 
(f) supply chain management; and 
(g) other financial matters.128    
In particular, chapter 12 of the MFMA details all the nitty-gritties in relation to the auditing 
procedure by the Auditor-General in municipalities. It begins by imposing a duty on every 
municipality, through the municipal council,129 and every municipal entity to prepare, for each 
financial year, and submit to the Auditor-General, annual financial statements which ‘fairly 
presents the state of affairs of the municipality or municipal entity.’130 Upon receipt of these 
statements, the Auditor-General must audit them and report accordingly.131 Furthermore, 
section 131(1) provides that the ‘municipality must [then] address any issues raised by the 
Auditor-General in an audit report’ and it is the responsibility of the Mayor to ensure 
compliance in this regard. The obligation is also placed on the MEC for local government to 
‘assess all annual financial statements of municipalities in the province, audit reports on such 
statements … and determine whether municipalities have adequately addressed any issues 
 
128  S 2 MFMA.  
129  S 133(1)(c)(ii) MFMA.  
130  Ss 121 & 122 MFMA. 
131  S 126(3)(a) ; (b) MFMA.  
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raised by the Auditor-General in the audit report.’132 In an instance where the Mayor or the 
MM, as the case might be, fails to table the annual report, the Auditor-General may submit the 
audit report directly to the municipal council, the NT, the provincial treasury and the MEC for 
local government.  
2.3.5. Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
The MSA provides guidance on how municipal powers are to be exercised and functions 
performed. It also sets out a uniform framework for the core processes of municipal planning, 
performance management systems, public administration, effective and optimal use of 
available resources as well as an overall organisational change. This Act also buttresses the 
notion that local government is developmental in purpose. Also, as Thornhill correctly 
posits,133 it promotes local democracy and levels the ground for inclusive and participatory 
local government by encouraging and instilling in municipalities a culture of community 
participation as a progressive move towards the social and economic development of local 
communities.  
In relation to auditing, section 38(a) requires all municipalities to develop a performance 
management system that is in line with their set objectives and IDPs. It goes further and sets 
out key components that must feature in the formulation of the developed management 
systems.134 Once established and operating, the performance management systems and 
outcomes are to be audited by the municipality’s internal audit unit and the Auditor-General.135 
Moreover, an annual performance report, together with the Auditor-General’s audit outcome 
forms part of the municipality’s annual report.136 Lastly, the annual report on actions taken by 
the MEC for local government to address issues raised by the Auditor-General in audit reports 
of municipalities and municipal entities must also be submitted to Parliament by the relevant 
Cabinet Minister.137 Given this, it is clear that the implementation of audit recommendations 
in municipalities requires a joint effort from different stakeholders from all spheres of 
government.    
 
132  S 131(2) MFMA.  
133  Thornhill (2008) 502.  
134  S 41(1) MSA.  
135  S 45 MSA. 
136  S 121(3)(c) MFMA.  
137  S 134 MFMA.   
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2.3.6. Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 
The Structures Act clarifies the status of municipalities and outlines the framework for their 
establishment in accordance with the constitutional requirements and criteria relating to 
categories and types of municipalities. It determines the appropriate division of functions and 
powers between categories of municipalities. The Act further regulates internal systems 
pertaining to governance structures, municipal office bearers and provides for appropriate 
electoral systems for local government,138 as well as defining the relationship between 
traditional authorities and local government.139 In particular, section 44 provides for the 
functions and powers of the executive committee. This is an important provision insofar as 
oversight is concerned since it empowers the committee to compel implementation of 
municipal by-laws and, arguably, audit recommendations of the Auditor-General, although not 
expressed.    
2.4. Key aspects of the Audit Report  
The PAA provides that an audit report by the Auditor-General must reflect an opinion, 
conclusion or findings on three aspects – financial statements of the auditee, compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations relating to financial matters, as well as the performance of the 
auditee against its predetermined objectives.140 In addition, the Auditor-General may include 
in an audit report ‘recommendations to address any matter’ arising from any of these three 
focus areas of auditing.141  
2.4.1. Financial Audit  
Section 20(2)(a) of the PAA requires the Auditor-General to include in an audit report his or 
her view, conclusion or findings on ‘the financial statements of the auditee in accordance with 
the applicable financial reporting framework and legislation’. In the context of this study, the 
applicable legislation is the MFMA and MSA.   
2.4.2. Compliance Audit 
Sections 20(2)(b) and 28(1)(b) of the PAA require the Auditor-General's report to reflect an 
opinion or conclusion on the auditee's compliance with any applicable legislation in relation to 
 
138  The long title.   
139  S 81 Structures Act.   
140  S 20(2) PAA.  
141  S 20(4) PAA.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
26 
 
financial management and other related matters. This usually occurs under the Compliance 
with laws and regulations heading in the audit report. The auditing of compliance with 
legislation is conducted in accordance with the International Standards on Assurance 
Engagements (ISAE). The audit report must further reflect material findings on non-
compliance with relevant legislation in respect of a wide range of matters, such as strategic 
planning, internal audit systems, budgets, financial statements and reports, procurement and 
contract management, expenditure management, asset and revenue management, financial 
misconduct and service delivery. 
2.4.3. Performance Audit 
Sections 20(2)(c) and 28(1)(c) of the PAA respectively, requires the Auditor-General’s report 
to reflect an opinion or conclusion on the auditee's reported performance against its 
predetermined objectives. The performance audit is also conducted in accordance with the 
ISAE standards. Furthermore, performance is audited against the applicable legislation and 
regulations, the relevant framework issued by the NT, as well as the circulars and guidelines 
regarding planning, management, monitoring and reporting of performance at local 
government, as developed by the NT.142 
2.5. Five Standard Audit Outcomes of the Auditor-General 
An audit outcome is essentially an independent view given by the Auditor-General about the 
state of the financial affairs of an audited institution. Fahami, Pordanjani and Mahmoudi 
observe that this is the ultimate product of the accounting chain, an expression of the auditor’s 
view on the financial statements, compliance and performance information of an auditee.143 
Furthermore, audit outcomes/findings have also been defined as written explanations of errors, 
weaknesses, deficiencies, adverse conditions, need for improvements or changes that are 
disclosed in an audit report.144 Chandler also indicates that an audit outcome is a constructively 
critical commentary on actions or inactions which, in the auditors’ independent judgement, 
 
142  Gildenhuis E & Roos M ‘The performance audit: Are there differences in the planning approach and practices 
followed within the South African public sector?’ (2015) 17/1 Southern African Journal of Accountability and 
Auditing Research 49-60 & Prinsloo J & Roos M Performance Auditing: A Step by Step Approach 2nd (2011) 
ch 1 & 2. 
143  Fahami Z, Pordanjani HAM & Mahmoudi MT ‘The accepted audit opinion and its impact on the relationship 
between earnings management and stock returns’ (2016) 6/2 Asian Journal of Research in Banking and 
Finance 56-64. 
144  Wadesango N, Chinamasa T & Mhaka C et al ‘Challenges faced by management in implementing audit 
recommendations: a literature review’ (2017) 7/4 Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & 
Institutions 53. 
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hinder the accomplishment of desired objectives in an effective and efficient manner.145 Lastly, 
Aikins correctly postulates that adverse audit findings/outcomes are ordinarily followed by 
recommendations for specific actions to rectify the cited deficiency.146 Once the audit process 
has been completed, therefore, the Auditor-General is required to give an audit outcome 
coupled with recommendations. This outcome can be one of the following: 
2.5.1. Disclaimer of Audit Opinion 
The Auditor-General is required to disclaim an opinion when the auditee has provided 
insufficient evidence or information on which to base an audit opinion, and conclude that the 
possible effects on the financial statements of undetected misstatements (if any) could be both 
material and pervasive.147 In other words, any information provided by the auditee which is 
not adequately supported by relevant documents, shall warrant a disclaimer. 
2.5.2. Adverse Audit Opinion 
An adverse audit opinion is given when the Auditor-General has obtained appropriate audit 
evidence, sufficiently supported by documents, but has concluded that ‘misstatements, 
individually or in the aggregate, are both material and pervasive to the financial statements’.148 
This would ordinarily occur when the reporting obligations in accordance with compliance 
framework have not been properly followed. 
2.5.3. Qualified Audit Opinion 
An audit opinion should be qualified when the Auditor-General, having obtained sufficient and 
appropriate audit evidence, finds that misstatements, individually or in aggregate, are material 
(but not pervasive) to the financial statements.149 The same opinion can also be given when the 
Auditor-General fails to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence on which to base the 
opinion, but concludes that the possible effects of undetected misstatements on the financial 
statements could be material but not pervasive.150  
 
145  Chandler R Auditing and Assurance (2014) ch 2.  
146  Aikins (2012) 45-65.  
147  IAASB Handbook of International Quality Control, Auditing, Review, Other Assurance, and Related Services 
Pronouncements (2017) 802.  
148  IAASB (2017) 802.  
149  IAASB (2017) 801.  
150  IAASB (2017) 801. 
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2.5.4. Unqualified Audit Opinion 
An unqualified audit opinion, also known as an unmodified opinion, simply means that the 
financial statements are free from any material misstatements and no adverse opinion has been 
made on performance against the predetermined objectives.151 There seems to be consensus 
among scholars that this is the most desirable audit opinion, although much better can still be 
done by an auditee.152  
2.5.5. Clean Audit Opinion 
A clean audit opinion indicates that the financial statements of the auditee are free from any 
material misstatements and there are no adverse material findings made on performance against 
predetermined objectives or compliance with key legislation and regulations. In essence, a 
clean audit opinion can only be obtained when the audit of financial statements, performance 
and compliance are completely without reservations. Therefore, in substance, there is not much 
difference between a clean audit opinion and an unqualified audit opinion.153 
2.6. Conclusion 
The powers and functions of the Auditor-General in the local government space are clearly 
defined in various pieces of legislation and have lately undergone significant reforms that are 
yet to face the test of reality. This has been demonstrated from the preceding discussions. The 
review of the public audit framework locates the Auditor-General as the Supreme Audit 
Institution of the country, constitutionally mandated to provide an independent oversight role 
through auditing and to table annual reports in Parliament on the accounts and financial 
management of auditee institutions. In this chapter, the historical foundations of the Auditor-
General as an institution have been traced. The chapter explored how the Auditor-General 
evolved over the years in terms of its functions and the scope of its mandate. In that regard, it 
has been pointed out that the Auditor-General’s mandated was expanded to include 
performance auditing in 1975. Also, the Auditor-General was not independent (since it acted 
at the behest of Treasury) until 1992.  The chapter also briefly explored the key components of 
 
151  IAASB (2017) 801-802. 
152  Oladipupo AO & Izedonmi FIO ‘Propensity of unqualified audit reports and auditors’ independence in 
Nigeria’ (2013) 7/3 African Research Review 34-46; Czerney K, Schmidt JJ & Thompson AM ‘Does auditor 
explanatory language in unqualified audit reports indicate increased financial misstatement risk?’ (2014) 89/6 
The Accounting Review 2115-2149.  
153  Van Schalwyk A ‘How improved compliance contributes to the achievement of a clean audit’ (2013) Official 
Journal of the Institute of Municipal Finance Officers 6-9.  
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the Auditor-General’s reports as well as the standard audit opinions that the Auditor-General 
may give.  
The next chapter looks into how the audit recommendations are (or should be) implemented in 
municipalities.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS IN MUNICIPALITIES 
3.1. Introduction 
As a point of departure, and as chapter one problematised, the non-implementation of the 
Auditor-General’s recommendations in municipalities has become a major concern and a fast-
growing problem across the country. The audit recommendations are often blatantly 
disregarded by various role-players who are responsible for their implementation. This, 
however, happens despite the very fact that audit recommendations are of great significance in 
facilitating good stewardship of public funds and promoting financial accountability.154 
Furthermore, these recommendations vary in scope and complexity and, as a result, their 
implementation may require coordination across various role-players, expertise and support 
functions within (and sometimes beyond) an institution.155  
This lays a firm basis for the contention that the relevant role-players from the provincial and 
national governments are also not off the hook in ensuring the implementation of audit 
recommendations in municipalities. Thus, part of the problem and responsibility is 
apportionable to them. This is so because they both have supervisory powers over 
municipalities of which, if adequately exercised, may circumvent the problem. Seen within this 
light, the question then that leads the focus of this chapter is: what are the legal duties and 
responsibilities of various role-players in municipalities, provincial and national governments 
towards implementing audit recommendations in municipalities?  
While the previous chapter discussed what audit recommendations are, their significance, 
different types and how they come into existence, this chapter builds on that framework by 
exploring how they are being (or supposed to be) implemented in municipalities. In the main, 
the chapter outlines the legal duties and responsibilities imposed on various municipal actors, 
provincial and national governments’ role-players insofar as the implementation of audit 
recommendations is concerned. From the premise of multi-agency approach towards ensuring 
public accountability and good governance, the chapter also discusses the roles and 
responsibilities of various institutions that may also contribute towards ensuring that 
 
154  Institute of Internal Auditors Supplemental Guidance: The Role of Auditing in Public Sector Governance 2 ed 
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municipalities implement audit recommendations. These institutions include the Auditor-
General, the Public Protector (PP), the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Directorate 
of Priority Crimes Investigation (Hawks), the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) and of course 
civil society organisations.   
3.2. Municipalities 
Within a municipality, several duties and responsibilities are imposed on various officials and 
structures in relation to the implementation of audit recommendations. This section seeks to 
outline these responsibilities in respect of individual officials and structures. 
3.2.1. Municipal council 
Section 151(2) of the Constitution provides that the executive and legislative authority of a 
municipality is vested in its council. This means that the council is the most important structure 
responsible for all the decisions and operations of a municipality.156 In its very nature, the 
council is the political structure and it is vested with decision-making powers and oversight.157 
Oversight entails an evaluation of whether the municipality runs its affairs in a manner that is 
legally compliant and based on good governance norms and principles.158 According to the NT 
and CoGTA, oversight should feature five key elements, as shown in the figure below. 
Figure 1: Key features of oversight 
 
Source: NT and CoGTA (2011).159    
 
156  Freedman W ‘The legislative authority of the local sphere of government to conserve and protect the 
environment: a critical analysis of Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013)’ 
(2014) 17/1 PELJ 569-578. See also De Visser J Roles and Responsibilities of the Municipal Manager (Local 
Government Working Paper Series: 1, 2001) 1-2.  
157  Siegel D ‘The Leadership Role of the Municipal Chief Administrative Officer’ (2010) 53/2 Canadian Public 
Administration 141. See also Steytler N, De Visser J & Mettler J Making Law: A Guide to Municipal Council 
(2000) ch 1.  
158  Bekink (2006) 372. 
159  NT & CoGTA Improving Oversight and Accountability: MPAC Guide & Toolkit (2011) 9. 
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With a view of enhancing its oversight role, the council may appoint oversight committees in 
terms of section 79 of the Structures Act and delegate some of its functions to them to deal 
with specific matters concerning issues raised by the Auditor-General, competency of audit 
and risk management, discipline and rules.160 This oversight network is important for 
accountability and it supports the ‘processes of clean audit and prevent issues highlighted in 
the Auditor-General’s report from being repeated’.161  
Since these committees are appointed by the council, they are accountable to it and thus they 
derive their mandate and powers through council resolutions.162 Given this legal nature, any 
decision taken by a section 79 committee can only be reviewed by the council and any power 
or function delegated to it can only be withdrawn by the council, again, through a council 
resolution.163 These committees include the MPAC and the Finance Committee and they are 
individually discussed below. 
3.2.1.1. Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC) 
The MPAC may be established in terms of section 79 of the Structures Act to perform an 
oversight function on behalf of the council. The main objective of having the MPAC is to 
promote good local governance, accountability, transparency, efficient financial management 
and optimal service delivery.164 Among its key functions, the MPAC should consider and 
evaluate the annual report and make recommendations to the council; track the progress made 
in terms of implementing previous audit recommendations; scrutinise the financial records and 
audit reports of the municipality and perform any of its functions delegated through council 
resolution.165 In performing its functions, the MPAC relies heavily on the NT guidelines issued 
in the form of Circular 32.  
The establishment of MPACs in municipalities is necessitated by several issues, including 
recurring poor audit outcomes, inadequate accountability systems, service delivery backlogs, 
as well as weak monitoring and evaluation of compliance.166 Since there is no statutory 
obligation available at present for the establishment of MPACs in municipalities, the Municipal 
Structures Amendment Bill (B19-2018) gives the position of MPACs a different outlook.  
 
160  Kraai, Holtzhausen & Malan (2017) 63. 
161  Kraai, Holtzhausen & Malan (2017) 66. 
162  NT & CoGTA (2011) 9.   
163  NT & CoGTA (2011) 10.   
164  NT & CoGTA (2011) 14.   
165  SCOPA: Limpopo Municipal Public Accounts Committee – The Road Ahead (2012) 4.  
166  SCOPA (2012) 3.  
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First, the Bill proposes that the establishment of MPACs be an obligatory duty of the council.167 
Secondly, in relation to the composition, the Bill does not stipulate who should be part of the 
MPAC but, instead, stipulates who should not. Excluded persons are the mayor, deputy mayor, 
any member of the executive committee, any member of the mayoral committee, speaker, whip 
and municipal officials.168 Thirdly, the role of the MPAC is to be determined by the council 
and must include the reviewing of the Auditor-General’s reports and providing an advice to the 
council on same,169 reviewing of internal audit reports from the Audit Committee,170 initiating 
and developing oversight report,171 as well as investigating and reporting to the council any 
matter affecting the municipality.172 
3.2.1.2. Finance Committee 
The Finance Committee may also be appointed by the council in terms of section 79 of the 
Structures Act with a different mandate from that of MPAC. Since this committee is established 
by the council, it is accountable (and reports) to the council. Its primary responsibility is to 
ensure that the processes and policies on municipal budget and planning are well aligned, 
comprehensive and credibly reflect the municipality’s priorities and policy initiatives.173 
Moreover, this committee must also review municipality’s SCM and procurement processes to 
ensure that they are fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective.174 The 
committee achieves this by monitoring and overseeing the performance of financial 
responsibilities assigned to the MM,175 and the CFO.176 Quite significantly, the committee is 
also required to identify financial problems facing the municipality and recommend to the 
council the corrective measures to those problems.177 
3.2.2. Audit Committee 
The audit committee of a municipality operates within a formal legislative framework that 
includes the MFMA and the NT Regulations. Section 166(1) of the MFMA provides that each 
 
167  Clause 24(1) Bill. 
168  Clause 24(2) Bill. 
169  Clause 24(3)(a) Bill. 
170  Clause 24(3)(b) Bill. 
171  Clause 24(3)(c) Bill. 
172  Clause 24(3)(d) Bill. 
173  NT & CoGTA (2011) 14.  
174  S 217(1) Constitution read with s 112 MFMA.  
175  Ss 60-79 MFMA. 
176  Ss 80-83 MFMA.  
177  Ss 54(1)(e) & 54(2) MFMA.  
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municipality must have an audit committee as an independent advisory and oversight body to 
the municipal council. It must comprise of at least three persons who are not in the employ of 
the municipality.178 Its central mandate is to ‘advise the council, … the [MM] and the 
management staff of the municipality’ on matters relating to internal financial controls and 
audits, accounting policies, effective governance, performance management and evaluation, 
compliance as well as the adequacy, reliability and accuracy of financial reports and 
information.179 In addition, this committee is also responsible for providing assurance on the 
adequacy, reliability and accuracy of financial reporting for the purposes of auditing, oversight 
and accountability.180 Moreover, the audit committee must monitor the adequacy of corrective 
measures taken by the municipal council in response to internal control deficiencies emanating 
from the internal audit process.181 Lastly, this committee must also respond and advise the 
municipal council on how best the latter can address any issues raised by the Auditor-General 
in the audit report.182 The table below presents the snapshot of the audit committee’s key duties 
and responsibilities.  
Table 1: Key responsibilities of the Audit Committee  
Source: Van der Nest, Thornhill and De Jager (2008) 549.183  
 
178  NT MFMA Circular 65: Internal Audit & Audit Committee (2012) 8.  
179  S 166(2)(a) MFMA. See also NT MFMA Circular 32: Internal Audit and Audit Committee (2012) 2-4. 
180  NT MFMA Circular 32: Internal Audit and Audit Committee (2012) 2-4. See also South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) The State of Municipal Audit Committees (2012) available at 
https://salga.org.za/Documents/Municipalities/Municipla%20Focus/Municipal%20Finance/State-of-Audit-
Committees.pdf (accessed 29 August 2019). 
181  NT MFMA Circular 32: Internal Audit and Audit Committee (2012) 2-4. 
182  S 166(2)(c) MFMA.  
183  Van der Nest DP, Thornhill C & De Jager J ‘Audit committees and accountability in the South African public 
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3.2.3. The Mayor  
Section 52 of the MFMA provides that the Mayor of the municipality must generally monitor 
and provide general political guidance over fiscal and financial affairs of the municipalities. In 
doing so, the Mayor may monitor and oversee the exercise of responsibilities assigned in terms 
of the MFMA to the accounting officer. Furthermore, the MFMA provides an incidental 
provision that if the municipality does not have a Mayor, the designated councillor must 
exercise the mayoral powers and responsibilities in chapter seven of the MFMA.184 It goes 
without saying that audit related matters in general, and the implementation of audit 
recommendations in particular, falls within the broad spectrum of ‘fiscal and financial affairs’ 
that the Mayor must provide guidance on. Moreover, the MFMA places a reporting burden on 
the Mayor to promptly alert ‘the [municipal] council and the MEC for local government in the 
province’ if the municipality encounters serious financial distress.185 Lastly, the Mayor must 
also identify any financial problems facing the municipality and ensure that the preventive 
measures devised by delegated committees (such as MPAC, Finance Committee and Audit 
Committee) are accordingly given effect.186  
3.2.4. Administration 
The administrative component of a municipality is also actively involved in the implementation 
of audit recommendations. For this discussion, focus is directed at three entities, namely; the 
MM, the CFO and the Internal Audit Unit.  
3.2.3.1. Municipal Manager (MM) 
The MM is the accounting officer of the municipality, and the term ‘head of administration’ is 
often used as an equivalent,187 meaning that he or she is responsible for the general 
administration of the municipality and the implementation of Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP).188 This office is the ‘engine’ of the municipality and this speaks to why numerous 
scholars agree that the MM’s role is ‘quite a complex and difficult one’.189 The complexity 
arise from the fact that the MM accounts to two ends, i.e. political and administrative arms. 
 
184  S 57 MFMA.     
185  S 54(2)(b) MFMA.  
186  S 54(1)(e) MFMA. 
187  S 83 MSA. 
188  S 55(1)(c) MSA. See also Executive council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development of the Republic of south Africa; Executive Council of KwaZulu-Natal v President 
of South Africa and Others 1999 (12) BCLR 1360 (CC) para 109. 
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This complexity exists alongside the general fiduciary duty, loyalty and diligence that the MM 
owes to the general public.190 However, Motubatse points out that the MM’s role is purely an 
administrative role wherein he or she is expected to liaise and report to the council on general 
matters affecting the municipality, including financial status of the municipality, internal and 
external audit matters, the progress made in the implementation of municipal policies, 
strategies and the IDP.191 The MM must also ensure that disciplinary steps are taken against 
municipal officials who commit financial misconduct.192 
In relation to auditing processes, the role of the MM entails the management of the financial 
administration of the municipality, preparation and fair presentation of the municipality’s 
financial statements to the Auditor-General in accordance with the requisite reporting and 
accounting standards compatible with the MFMA provisions and the Generally Recognised 
Accounting Practice (GRAP).193 Within this context, ‘fair presentation of financial statements’ 
means the production of financial statements that are free from material misstatements, due to 
either fraud or human error. Once the audit process is complete, and audit recommendations 
given, the MM must ensure the implementation of the same and report on the progress made 
in that regard to the municipal council and the Mayor.194 The diagram below depicts the 
position of the MM within the accountability cycle of a municipality.195 
Figure 2: The position of MM within the accountability cycle of a municipality 
 
Source: Adapted from the NT (2012).  
 
190  S 61 MFMA.  
191  Motubatse (2016) 86.  
192  This is called ‘effecting consequence’. 
193  S 62 MFMA. 
194  S 61(1) MFMA.  
195  NT Chief Financial Officers Handbook for Municipalities (2012) 7.  
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3.2.3.2. Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
The CFO of a municipality ‘is administratively in charge of the budget and treasury office’.196 
This office is the financial management hub of the municipality where the core finance 
functions are performed and internal controls implemented. The MFMA also requires the CFO, 
under delegated powers, to advise and assist the accounting officer in carrying out his or her 
wide range of financial management responsibilities, such as budget planning, financial 
reporting and monitoring the implementation plan for internal and external audit 
recommendations,197 as the case might be. In essence, what the latter means is that the CFO 
plays a central role in implementing financial reforms at the direction of the accounting officer, 
with the assistance of appropriately skilled finance personnel.198  
3.2.3.3. Internal Audit Unit 
Section 165(1) of the MFMA provides that each municipality must have an internal audit unit’. 
The mandate of this entity includes preparing a risk-based audit plan and an internal audit 
program for each financial year.199 Furthermore, the audit unit must advise the MM and 
periodically report to the audit committee on the implementation of the internal audit plan, as 
well as on any other matter in relation to internal controls and audit, compliance with legislative 
framework, risk and risk management, as well as accounting procedures and practices.200 It is 
also important to note that the municipality may outsource any of its internal audit functions if 
it does not have the necessary capacity to perform such functions.201  
3.3. Provincial Government  
Although municipalities are autonomous,202 their autonomy is exercised subject to the 
supervision of the provincial (and national) government.203 The effect of this supervision is that 
the autonomy can be curtailed under certain prescribed circumstances and to varying degrees, 
depending entirely on the distinct merits of each situation. Steytler correctly points out that ‘the 
 
196  S 81(1)(a) MFMA.  
197  S 81(1)(d)-(e) MFMA. 
198  Ntliziywana (2017) 351. 
199  S 165(2)(a) MFMA.  
200  S 165(2)(b) MFMA. 
201  S 165(3) MFMA. 
202  Ntliziywana P ‘Municipal Financial Misconduct Regulations: The Draft’ (2012) 14/3 Local Government 
Bulletin 12-15. See Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) 
para 26. 
203  S 154(1) Constitution. See also Malan L 'Intergovernmental relations and co-operative government in South 
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extent of supervision inevitably defines the level of local autonomy.’204 This occurs when the 
other spheres of government supervise municipalities through monitoring, support and routine 
evaluation.205 In the main, the object of supervision is to strengthen municipalities’ 
performance, enhance their development and capacity,206 foster fiscal discipline and ensure 
their compliance with the legislative prescripts when exercising their powers.  
Part of the problem outlined in chapter one is the failure by provinces to adequately supervise 
and monitor municipalities in their implementation of audit recommendations. Under normal 
course of events, in this instance, two things ought to happen. First, the province may enforce 
compliance with audit recommendations or, secondly, may use them for wider intervention.207 
In that light, this section discusses the legal duties and responsibilities imposed on the 
provincial government insofar as the implementation of audit recommendations in 
municipalities is concerned.  
3.3.1. Provincial role players 
As already stated, the provinces are, by agreement, required to assist municipalities ‘in building 
their capacity for efficient, effective and transparent financial management’.208 The goal is to 
avert impending financial problems of the municipality, thus improving financial viability.209 
To achieve this goal, responsibilities are apportioned among various role players at provincial 
level, namely the MEC for Finance, Provincial Treasury and the MEC for Local Government. 
3.3.1.1. MEC for Local Government  
The MEC for local government must establish mechanisms, processes and procedures to assess 
the support needed by municipalities to strengthen their capacity to manage their own affairs 
and perform their duties.210 Furthermore, section 105(3) of the MSA authorises the MEC to 
require municipalities to submit any information to a specified provincial organ either at regular 
intervals or within a specified period. However, such request should not impose additional 
reporting burdens on municipalities. If the MEC is of a view that a municipality is failing to 
 
204  Steytler N The Place and Role of Local Government in Federal Systems (2005) 7.  
205  Steytler (2005) 185-186. See also Steytler & De Visser (2007) ch 15; Khumalo, Dawood & Mahabir (2016) 
222 and Lagoon Bay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning of the Western Cape and Others (10751/2011) [2011] ZAWCHC 327 para 12. 
206  De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005) 40.  
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fulfil its statutory obligations, he or she may intervene.211 The MEC is also required to receive 
municipalities’ annual reports of each financial year.212 Once the annual reports have been 
received, the MEC is then required to compile and submit a consolidated report on the state 
and performance of the municipalities within the province to the Minister and the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP).213 
3.3.1.2. MEC for Finance 
The MEC for Finance is the political head of the provincial treasury and is responsible for the 
decisions of the latter, except those taken as a result of a delegation.214 Moreover, the MEC is 
required to approve the time frames within which the municipalities in the province must table 
their annual budgets.215 The MEC is empowered to withdraw funds from municipality’s 
account if it failed to approve the budget within the prescribed time frames.216 In instances 
where there is an intervention in a municipality experiencing financial crisis, the MEC is 
required to review such intervention every three months and report the any progress to the 
Minister, among others.217      
3.3.1.3. Provincial Treasury  
The functions, powers and responsibilities of the provincial treasury are outlined in section 5 
of the MFMA. The provincial treasury is required to fulfil all responsibilities imposed on it in 
terms of the legislative framework.218 The most important one is assisting the National 
Treasury to enforce compliance with the prescribed measures stipulated in section 216(1) of 
the Constitution.219 Furthermore, the provincial treasury may also assist municipalities in 
preparing their annual budgets.220 Its additional roles include monitoring compliance by 
municipalities,221 compliance with their financial reporting duties,222 as well as guiding the 
implementation of their budget plans.223 Lastly, the provincial treasury is accountable (on 
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quarterly basis) to the National Treasury and may exercise any power(s) and perform any 
function delegated to it by the latter.224 
3.3.2. Monitoring 
Annually, the Auditor-General furnishes the relevant provincial executive (MECs for Local 
Government and Finance) with the audit reports of all municipalities in the province. As 
indicated in previous discussions, these reports constitute a reliable source of information upon 
which a provincial executive may act, through monitoring (or intervention). The provincial 
government is required to monitor the municipalities to ensure that they comply with the 
relevant laws,225 and that they address the key issues noted in their audit reports. Furthermore, 
the provincial executive, as part of its monitoring task, may also conduct regular assessments 
on the state of compliance, with performance and legislative framework, of the municipality.226 
Monitoring is broad in scope and among its facets is financial. In order for financial monitoring 
to occur, the municipalities are required to submit quarterly financial reports to the MEC of 
local government, and of finance, as the case might be. Upon receiving the reports, the MEC 
is required to evaluate and scrutinise them to satisfy him/herself about the state of compliance 
of the municipality with the financial reporting legal framework.227 It is submitted that part of 
this scrutinisation should particularly be on municipality’s progress in giving effect to audit 
recommendations. Furthermore, where the MEC ‘has reason to believe’228 that an irregularity 
or non-compliance (in a form of maladministration, fraud or corruption) exists, an investigation 
may be conducted in that regard.229 Monitoring may also be done through regular visits to 
municipalities by the relevant provincial executive. Chigwata terms this ‘monitoring visits’.230  
3.3.3. Support 
The provincial government must assess the nature (and degree)231 of support needed by the 
municipalities in order to effectively manage their own affairs and fulfil their statutory 
 
224  S 5(8) MFMA.  
225  S 155(6)(a) Constitution.  
226  Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2009) 15-5.  
227  Steytler & De Visser (2007) 15-13. See also Litvack J & Seddon J (eds) Decentralisation: Briefing Notes 
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obligations, including financial.232 In doing so, it may rely on the information contained in the 
audit reports of municipalities. The provinces must also establish mechanisms, processes and 
procedures to provide guidance on how they support and monitor municipalities in general and, 
in particular, financial management.233 Support, by definition, refers to measures of assistance 
taken by the national government (and/or provincial government) to ensure that municipalities 
are able to carry out their functions adequately.234  
According to Steytler and De Visser, the understanding of support is twofold.235 On the one 
hand, they argue, support should be understood in the context of supervision, which is aimed 
‘to prevent a decline or degeneration of such structures, powers and functions’.236 On the other 
hand, support should be understood in the context of co-operation, which does not necessarily 
seek to prevent a decline but rather to support ‘local government as an equal partner in the 
achievement of common goals.’237 The circumstances of each case will always determine the 
appropriate form of support that the concerned municipality needs.238   
3.3.4. Intervention  
Intervention, as a form of provincial supervision over municipalities, is of common occurrence 
in practice and often the subject of contention in theory. Two instrumental provisions are worth 
mentioning in this regard, namely; section 139 of the Constitution and chapter 13 of the 
MFMA.239 These provisions broadly outline three sets of circumstances in terms of which the 
provincial government (and the national government if certain circumstances prevail) could 
intervene in a municipality.  
The first is regular intervention in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution, which empowers 
the provincial executive to intervene in a municipality that fails to fulfil an executive obligation 
in terms of the Constitution or any empowering legislation. This type of intervention cannot be 
invoked in respect of a municipality’s failure in relation to legislative acts.240 Although the 
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opinion on what constitutes an ‘executive obligation’ has long been deeply divided, the court 
dealt with this question at length in the Mnquma judgment.241 Intervention in terms of section 
139(1) of the Constitution is three-fold. The first step is an issuance of a directive (a 
command/instruction) to a municipality stating the extent of the failure and the remedial steps 
to be taken in addressing such failure.242 This step, in certain circumstances, may be a precursor 
of any other section 139(1) step and, in other instances, it may not.243 The second step is the 
assumption of responsibility through notice of intervention.244 In the notice, the provincial 
executive must inform the defaulting municipality of the ‘executive obligations it allegedly 
cannot or does not fulfil’.245 This requirement is important because a clearly spelt out notice of 
intervention will allow a municipality to identify and work on its deficiencies, to know the 
scope of intervention and to challenge such intervention if it is of a view that an intrusion in its 
autonomy is unmerited.246 The last step is the dissolution of municipal council. Section 
139(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that the provincial executive may dissolve council ‘if 
exceptional circumstances warrant such step’.247 This is the most drastic step among the three, 
with far-reaching impact on the overall functioning of a municipality. The substantive 
requirements of this step were considered in Ngaka Modiri Molema judgment.248 
The second intervention is in terms of section 139(4) of the Constitution which mandates the 
province to intervene in a municipality on the basis of its failure to adopt a budget and related 
matters. The latter section provides for the dissolution of the municipal council as well.  
The third intervention is in terms of section 139(5) of the Constitution which permits the 
provincial executive to intervene in municipalities that are encountering crisis in their financial 
affairs.249 The lighter version of this measure is found in section 137 of the MFMA.250 Section 
139(5) intervention is a mandatory duty on the provincial executive and not discretionary, as it 
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is in case of intervention under section 137 of the MFMA. The MEC for finance plays a 
significant role under section 139(5) intervention. There are two conditions that would suggest 
that a certain municipality is having a crisis in its financial affairs, namely; if a municipality is 
in a serious or persistent material breach of its statutory obligations and/or is constantly failing 
to meet its financial commitments.251 The MFMA provides indicators to guide in establishing 
the presence or absence of these conditions. These indicators include instances where the 
municipality has failed to make settle payment(s) due to its creditor(s),252 failed to honour a 
contract of security,253 failed to make payments amounting to more than the amount prescribed 
by the Minister of Finance,254 the municipality’s failure to honour its financial commitments 
has impacted (or likely to impact) on the price of credit to other municipalities,255 and/or such 
failure has substantially impaired municipality’s ability to procure goods, services or credit on 
usual commercial terms.256 All these indicators are evident in most municipalities, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter through case study municipalities. 
3.4. National Government  
The national government, through CoGTA, has an enormous responsibility, as expressed in the 
National Development Plan (NDP), of ensuring that municipalities are capable to contribute 
towards achieving the developmental state.257 The national government has the supervisory 
powers over municipalities,258 albeit on an implicit basis.259 This section considers, in 
particular, the national supervision over municipalities’ financial aspect. This aspect is 
considered ‘a dominant feature of the Constitution’.260 According to Fombad, the national 
government’s supervision over the affairs of municipalities fosters what he terms an ‘upward 
accountability’.261 The author defines an ‘upward accountability’ as ‘the degree to which local 
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government is supervised by the central government’.262 Therefore, in the main, this 
supervision entails the systems for auditing of public accounts, the setting of standards for 
service delivery, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of municipalities’ performance in 
relation to the latter.263  
Moreover, Steytler and De Visser have correctly pointed out that the national government, 
through the NT, assumes ‘the driver’s seat’ in scrutinising municipal finances and other matters 
relating to fiscal discipline.264 Several extensive financial reporting duties have been imposed 
on municipalities and a wide range of circulars and regulations have been adopted to provide 
guidance in that regard.265 This is in response to the constitutional duty imposed on the NT to 
enforce compliance with the prescribed measures for transparency and expenditure control in 
the public sector.266 The supervisory function of the national government, Steytler argues, 
‘entails the establishment and structuring of municipalities, regulating the exercise of their 
competencies, monitoring the exercise of those competencies and, in certain circumstances, 
intervening in municipalities’.267  
To that end, this section seeks to answer the following question, which feeds back to the 
overarching research question: How can and does the national government, through the NT 
and CoGTA, assist municipalities to effectively implement audit recommendations? The 
section will also explore measures that the national government can utilise to encourage and 
compel municipalities to comply with audit recommendations. 
3.4.1. Regulation 
Section 216(1) of the Constitution affords the national government significant supervisory role 
and broad regulatory powers in terms of section 216(1). This provision requires the national 
legislation to establish the NT and prescribe measures to ensure transparency and expenditure 
control. It achieves this by introducing generally recognised accounting practice, uniform 
expenditure classifications, as well as uniform norms and standards.268 Additional obligation 
is imposed on the NT to enforce compliance with these norms and standards.269 In executing 
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its enforcement role, the NT may stop the transfer of funds to any defaulting organ of state,270 
including municipalities. Furthermore, apart from section 216 of the Constitution, the national 
government also has broad legislative and executive ‘authority to see to the effective 
performance by municipalities of their functions … by regulating the exercise … of their 
executive authority referred to in section 156(1).’271 Regulation here includes the regulation of 
municipal finances. However, the national government’s regulatory powers over municipalities 
are not untrammelled, meaning that they can be invoked only ‘to a limited degree’.272  
The MSA also empowers the Minister for local government to set essential national and 
minimum standards for any function assigned to municipalities, including the finance and audit 
sectoral area of municipalities.273 In doing, consultations must be made with other stakeholders 
such as the Minister of Finance, the organised local government representing local government 
nationally,274 the MECs for local government and any Cabinet member responsible for the 
regulation of the concerned service.275 Other national cabinet members may also exercise the 
power to set minimum and national standards for the service for which they are responsible.276 
So far, the Minister of local government and the NT have made regulations and guidelines on 
a wide range of sectoral areas of local government.277  
3.4.2. Monitoring   
The national government derives its authority to monitor local government from its inherent 
supervisory powers.278 In order for monitoring to take place, the municipalities are required to 
submit within a given time-frame specific information concerning their affairs to certain 
organ(s) of state as determined by the Minister for local government.279 In relation to financial 
monitoring, in particular, the NT plays a prominent role. Among other things, the latter is 
required to monitor municipalities’ compliance with their financial reporting duties imposed 
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by the MFMA and the ‘applicable standards of generally accepted accounting practices’.280 
The NT, in the process of monitoring, may also investigate ‘any system of financial 
management and internal control’ in a municipality,281 and make recommendations to that 
effect.282 Relying on the same provision, it is argued, the NT may investigate non-compliance 
of audit recommendations and recommend a proper cause of action for the responsible official. 
Furthermore, the NT may also require any information for inspection from the MM, or cause 
that information to be submitted to the Auditor-General.283  
3.4.3. Support 
The national government is constitutionally obliged to support and strengthen the capacity of 
municipalities so that they can manage their own affairs, exercise their powers and perform 
their functions.284 The NT does this by promoting good budget planning, fiscal discipline and 
a transparent financial management.285 Additional duties are contained in chapter 5 of the 
MFMA on co-operative government. The most important one is to assist the municipalities by 
building their capacity for efficient, effective and transparent financial management,286 as well 
as to support them in their efforts ‘to identify and resolve their financial problems’.287  
There has also been other strategies and programmes to support municipalities, such as ‘Project 
Consolidate’, ‘Siyenza Manje’, the ‘Turn Around Strategy’ and ‘Back to Basics’. However, De 
Visser contends that these strategies have been in use for over the past two decades and yet no 
improvement in performance.288 The author further argues that if these strategies are 
implemented adequately, they may yield positive outcomes and, otherwise, it will just be ‘a 
case of doing the same thing but expecting different results’.289  
3.4.4. Intervention 
Section 139(7) of the Constitution empowers the national executive to intervene in a 
municipality in the event where a provincial executive fails in its duty to intervene. This 
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national intervention is only in respect two circumstances, namely; where there is a budgetary 
breakdown in a municipality,290 or a crisis in financial affairs.291 The substantive requirements 
for this intervention are that the provincial government cannot or does not intervene (for 
whatever reason) and/or that the provincial intervention is inadequate.292 Before it can 
intervene, as required by the principle of co-operative government, the national executive must 
first consult with the provincial executive.293   
3.4.5. Stoppage of transfer of funds to municipalities  
The Constitution provides that the NT may stop the transfer of funds to an organ of state for a 
serious or persistent material breach of the measures outlined in section 216(1).294 The stoppage 
is applicable to both conditional and unconditional transfers to the municipality.295 In 2004/5, 
the NT relied on this provision by withholding and delaying grants to 18 defaulting 
municipalities as a strategy to encourage them to submit the financial statements to the Auditor-
General, of which yielded positive results.296 Again, in 2015, the NT invoked this provision 
against 60 municipalities that were not able to pay their debts with Eskom and water boards in 
line with section 65(2) of the MFMA.297 According to Steytler and De Visser, section 216(2) 
‘is a temporary measure that, at the very least, causes discomfort and annoyance, if not 
shame’.298  
Like with other measures, there are certain procedural safeguards that must be met before the 
NT can decide to stop the transfers to municipalities.299 One is that the municipalities must be 
given the opportunity to submit written representations in relation to the proposed stoppage,300 
and the MEC for local government must be informed in that regard.301 Also, if the stoppage 
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affects the provision of service, then the provincial executive must closely monitor the 
process.302 
3.5. Other Institutions 
South Africa has adopted a multi-agency approach towards reinforcing accountability and good 
governance principles within the public sector, including municipalities. This means that 
besides the provincial and national governments’ supervisory mechanisms, there are other 
institutions that may play certain roles in enforcing compliance with audit recommendations in 
municipalities. In the case of Hugh Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa,303 the 
Constitutional Court emphasised the point that the effective implementation of anti-corruption 
strategies in public sector depends largely on having strong and independent expert and 
forensic investigative agencies.304 These include institutions such as the Auditor-General, the 
Public Protector (PP), the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Special Investigating Unit 
(SIU), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), and of course civil society organisations. In 
this section, the potential roles of these institutions in relation to the subject matter are explored.  
3.5.1. The Auditor-General 
As already discussed in chapter two, the PAAA introduced new enforcement powers of the 
Auditor-General. The institution believes that these powers, through effective implementation, 
place it in a better position to adequately address the longstanding issues in municipalities, 
including the non-implementation of audit recommendations.305 The Auditor-General is now 
required to make a follow up on whether the accounting officer or authority has implemented 
the recommendations as may be contained in the audit report in relation to any material 
irregularity.306  
The PAAA defines material irregularity as ‘any non-compliance with, or contravention of, 
legislation, fraud, theft or a breach of a fiduciary duty identified during an audit [process]’.307 
This means the focus of an audit will have to assess thoroughly the existence or otherwise of 
material irregularities in the transactions and financial statements of municipalities. In case 
where material irregularity is identified, the Auditor-General may refer such to the relevant 
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public body with a specific mandate and powers suitable to investigate the nature of that 
specific suspected material irregularity.308 The agencies will deal with matter within their own 
legal mandate and take appropriate action where necessary. These agencies/institutions include 
the Public Protector, Special Investigations Unit (SAPS) and this brings the study to discuss 
them individually in the subsequent section. 
3.5.2. The Public Protector (PP) 
The PP is one of the chapter 9 institutions and its functions and powers are outlined in section 
182(1) of the Constitution. They include to investigate any conduct in state affairs or in the 
public administration in any sphere of government that is alleged or suspected to be improper 
or to result in impropriety or prejudice,309 to report on that conduct,310 and to take appropriate 
remedial action.311 Perhaps what sets the PP more distinct from other chapter 9 institutions is 
the authority of its remedial actions, which are of binding effect unless successfully reviewed 
by the relevant court of law.312 The Constitutional Court jurisprudence on this subject is 
clear.313 Just like the audit reports prepared by the Auditor-General, the reports by the PP are 
valuable sources of reference in measuring the public service and accountability.314  
3.5.3. The South African Police Service 
The SAPS is constitutionally empowered and mandated, in terms of the Constitution, to 
prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure the inhabitants 
and their property, as well as to uphold and enforce the law.315 It performs this mandate through 
traditional way of arresting, detaining, charging and bringing anyone accused of any crime 
before the court of law with sufficient evidence to secure a successful prosecution.316 
Furthermore, in the process of investigating crime, the SAPS has the authority to search (with 
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or without a warrant)317 and seize articles, gather evidence from any premises linked with the 
commission of crimes such as fraud and corruption.318  
These legislative provisions facilitate smooth execution of the SAPS’s investigative functions 
and the gathering of forensic evidence necessary to prove a suspected material irregularity in a 
municipality.319 Since the PAAA criminalises ‘material irregularity’,320 this means that any 
official who is reported to have committed it in the audit reports (by action or inaction), is 
guilty of a prosecutable offence. In instances where the investigation seem to be difficult, the 
intelligence techniques such as ‘wiretapping’ are often utilised to trace the relevant information 
from the telecommunications between the implicated municipal official(s) and the person with 
whom they are perpetuating these crimes.321   
3.5.3.1. Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI) – The Hawks 
The DPCI, dubbed the Hawks, was established in 2009 in terms of the SAPS Amendment Act 
57 of 2008 and the NPA Amendment Act 56 of 2008. Its mandate entails the prevention, 
combating and investigation into national priority offences, focusing on serious organised 
crimes and commercial crimes, misappropriation of large amounts of public funds, fraud and 
corruption.322 The DPCI is composed of a Commercial Crime Unit, Financial Investigation and 
Assets Forfeiture Unit, Organised Crime Unit, the Priority Crime Management Centre and 
Support Services.323 The Hawks continues to be active in executing their mandate effectively. 
For instance, in 2018, it investigated a case of corruption involving millions of rands that ‘went 
missing’ in Ditsobotla.324 Lately, its Assets Forfeiture Unit raided the bedevilled former 
eThekwini mayor, Zandile Gumede's property following her suspension and arrest on account 
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of corruption charges regarding 208 million rands for Durban solid waste tender.325 It is argued 
that the irregular and fruitless expenditures, as well as municipal resources that are often 
reported to be ‘missing’ in audit reports, constitute ‘misappropriation of large amounts of 
public funds’. Thus, these acts fall under the investigative jurisdiction of the Hawks and the 
latter has technical support to investigate and bring to the book errant officials.  
3.5.4. Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
The SIU is an independent public entity operating as one of the key law enforcement agencies. 
It was established in 1997 in terms of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 
74 of 1996 (SIU Act). Section 4 of the SIU Act outlines the functions of the SIU and they 
include to investigate allegations and collect evidence regarding acts of fraud, corruption, 
misuse of public funds, malpractice and maladministration or omissions related to their 
investigations with a view to instituting civil proceedings for the recovery of losses suffered 
by the State. It also plays a critical role in the prevention of future losses and in enforcing anti-
corruption legislation, as well as in the promotion of good governance practices within the 
public sector.326 The SIU achieves its mandate through forensic investigations and civil 
litigation.327 In certain instances, it may also refer the matter to the National Prosecuting 
Authority or the Asset Forfeiture Unit, as the case might be.328 The SIU has a track record of 
successful investigations into acts of irregular procurement and supply chain practices, 
fraudulent qualifications, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, fraud and corruption, nepotism 
and irregular awarding of tenders in municipalities.329 In the course of its investigations, it may 
subpoena, search, seize and interrogate witnesses under oath.330  
3.5.5. Civil Society Organisations  
The positive impact of civil society organisations in the promotion and advancement of 
constitutional democracy is readily noticeable. The late Zola Skweyiya, quoted by Barnard and 
Terreblanche, stated that ‘[civil society organisations] continue to act as monitors of the public 
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good and safeguard the interests of the disadvantaged sections of society.’331 The contemporary 
trends also shows that these organisations have increasingly become the last line of defence 
fighting on behalf of ordinary citizens against the proliferation of corruption and impunity for 
officials who have no regard for the law, public service delivery failures and general 
dysfunctionality cutting across several state institutions.332 To this end, it is argued that a 
resurgence of civil society movement in local government bears the potential to foster and 
promote accountability in municipalities by monitoring whether municipalities implement the 
audit recommendations.   
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the institutional structures and processes for the implementation of 
audit recommendations in municipalities. First, the task of implementing audit 
recommendations is a shared one. This is so because all municipal officials and structures have 
a role or two to play towards achieving this common goal. Secondly, the role and 
responsibilities of various provincial actors as to how they are supposed to supervise 
municipalities over financial affairs through intervention, support or monitoring were also 
discussed. These provincial actors include the MECs for Finance and Local Government, as 
well as the provincial treasury. Furthermore, the chapter was not unmindful of the fact that the 
provincial government may also fail to effectively supervise municipalities. Thus, thirdly, the 
discussion was made on how the national government, through CoGTA and NT, may come in 
handy in circumventing the effects of such failure though regulation, monitoring, support and 
intervention. Various kinds of interventions were briefly discussed. Lastly, the mandates of 
various institutions, apart from the provincial and national governments, that may also play a 
role towards enforcing compliance with audit recommendations in municipalities were 
systematically identified and discussed. The next chapter explores the trends in practice in 
relation to the legal framework discussed in this chapter. This will be done in respect of three 
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case study municipalities in the North West Province, namely; Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and 
Tswaing municipalities.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GOOD LOCAL GOVERNANCE – A DREAM DEFFERED IN THE NORTH WEST? 
EXPLORING EMERGING TRENDS AND ISSUES IN PRACTICE 
4.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the legal framework for institutional structures and processes 
for the implementation of audit recommendations in municipalities, and further outlined the 
roles and responsibilities of each involved actor in that regard. Taking these discussions to a 
different plane, this chapter explores the trends in practice. While the previous chapter laid 
down the legal duties and responsibilities of various role players, this chapter builds on that 
and asks: are these role players, in practice, acting in line with their different legal mandates?  
Structurally, the chapter is divided into three parts. First, it commences by giving a general 
state of affairs in the North West Province by sketching a general historical overview of 
financial mismanagement across municipalities in the province and outlining the supervisory 
measures taken by the province in its quest to address the challenges faced by its municipalities. 
Secondly, the chapter contextualises the problem by exploring three case study municipalities, 
namely: Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and Tswaing Local Municipalities. These municipalities 
represent the general state of other municipalities within the province and probably beyond. 
Lastly, the chapter explores the emerging trends, causes and problems facing municipalities in 
the province. 
4.2. State of affairs in the North West Province 
Given the prevailing circumstances in the North West, it is not an over exaggerated description 
that the province depicts the government went horribly wrong, both at local and provincial 
levels. This section provides a brief highlight in that regard.  
4.2.1. Municipalities 
The latest audit report (2017/18) by the Auditor-General contains a shocking revelation about 
the state of municipalities in the North West Province. It reveals that no single municipality in 
the province has obtained an unqualified financial audit outcome,333 not even to mention a 
clean audit. In fact, this has always been the case since the emergence of local government in 
2000.334 Five municipalities in the province recklessly invested with the bedevilled VBS 
Mutual Bank between the financial years 2016/17 and 2017/18 which consequently caused 
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severe financial losses to them.335 As of July 2019, 13 out of 22 municipalities in the province 
were placed under section 139 intervention due to financial mismanagement and overall 
relapse.336 Alongside this, violent public protests for poor service delivery are also on the 
rise.337 The Auditor-General highlights several issues that stimulate and exacerbate these 
regressions. Among those issues is the non-implementation of audit recommendations.338  
4.2.2. Provincial government 
The previous chapter gave a comprehensive outline of the general legal duties of supervision 
of the provinces over municipalities. The position and context under which the provinces can 
(or must) intervene in municipalities by either implementing audit recommendations or, on the 
basis of them, invoke a wider intervention, was given. However, it is argued that this has not 
been done in the North West Province or, if claimed to have been done, has proven to be 
ineffective. The following discussions on the failure of poorly constructed measures of support 
will support the latter position, followed by the case studies. Table 1 below provides a 
breakdown of section 139 interventions per province, with the North West topping the list. 
Table 2: Provincial distribution of interventions 1998-2019  
Source: Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI).339 
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The North West municipalities, just like with audit outcomes, are the worst performing 
municipalities in terms of meeting their service delivery expectations, hence the province has 
consistently been experiencing violent service delivery protests.340 The rampant nature of these 
protests makes their quantification difficult. On 17 September 2019, the NCOP’s permanent 
delegates of the North West Province received a report detailing an appalling state of 
municipalities in the province.341  
4.2.2.1. Provincial support through policy intervention  
In 2017, the province devised and adopted the Pre-and-Post Audit Action Plan (PAAP) 
resolutions for municipalities through Circular 1/2017.342 All the municipalities in the 
province, with the assistance of the provincial treasury, had to adopt, implement and monitor 
the PAAP resolutions. These resolutions were taken in response to poor audit outcomes across 
the municipalities over the past two decades of local government crisis in the province. The 
main object was to address the concerns (thus preventing their recurrence) in municipalities as 
has consistently been identified by the Auditor-General over the years.343 Part of what should 
reflect in the PAAP of each municipality is all the internal control failures and audit related 
issues, as well as the responsibility assignment to the relevant municipal actors who must then 
address the identified failures.344 The time frames for the implementation and submission of 
progress report by municipalities in this regard are determined by the MEC for local 
government.  
One of the PAAP resolutions requires the municipal council to establish the ‘Audit Steering 
Committee’ in the municipality. This committee deals with all aspects relating to internal 
control systems, audit processes and monitors the financial reporting duties of the 
municipality.345 The composition of the committee includes the MM, CFO, all section 57 
managers, representatives of the Auditor-General, internal audit entities and other relevant 
members who may incidentally be invited, as the case might be.346  
 
340  Tau P ‘6 ANC Councillors’ houses among 8 torched in violent North West protest’ City Press 17 September 
2019. See also Sicetsha (2019).      
341  RSA Parliament ‘Parliament on state of municipalities in North West province’ (2019) available at 
https://www.gov.za/xh/node/791934 (accessed 19 September 2019). 
342 NWPG: Treasury ‘Adoption of Pre-and-Post Audit Action Plan Resolutions: Circular 1/2017’ (2017) 1 
available at http://www.treasury.nwpg.gov.za/mfma/Scan0054.pdf  (accessed 20 September 2019).  
343  S 131(1) MFMA. See also NWPG: Treasury (2017) 2.  
344  NWPG: Treasury (2017) 2.  
345  NWPG: Treasury (2017) 2.  
346  NWPG: Treasury (2017) 2.  
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The department of local government has also adopted a provincial policy to provide guidance 
on the implementation of section 139 interventions and support in terms of section 154 of the 
Constitution in the municipalities.347 This policy outlines the framework for the appointment 
of Administrators, and their remuneration, for the purposes of section 139 interventions. The 
obvious contradiction and retrospective nature of this policy is that instead of being modelled 
towards promoting strong and effective local governance, thus avoiding provincial 
interventions in municipalities, it rather regulates how to facilitate the latter. On that basis, it is 
not solution-oriented. Furthermore, the policy lacks innovation and there is nothing much to be 
said about it since it only regurgitates and rephrases the constitutional provisions.  
Therefore, despite the shared aspirations in the above policy inventions, the state of local 
government in the province remains bedevilled, with financial distresses, proliferating system 
regressions and widespread violent protests.   
4.2.2.2. Intergovernmental support 
In 2018, the two provincial departments (finance and local government) have collaborated 
through a memorandum of understanding to restore and ensure financial viability across 
municipalities in the province.348 The main objective of this departmental collaboration is to 
improve municipalities’ compliance with their statutory obligations through support, 
monitoring and oversight in terms of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the MFMA, 
the MSA and other laws.349 This joint intervention programme targets ‘the 12 priority 
municipalities’, from which 3 are the case studies of this research.350 These 12 municipalities 
are in extreme financial distress. To this end, a joint integrated support plan has been adopted 
to assist those municipalities.351 The integrated plan considers a wide range of aspects for 
assessment, such as governance, financial reporting, service delivery performance, revenue and 
expenditure management practices, as well as audit outcomes.352    
 
347  NWPG: LG ‘Provincial Policy Guidelines on the Implementation of Sections 139 Interventions and Section 
154 Support in Municipalities’ (2019) available at 
http://www.nwpg.gov.za/HumanSettlements/site/documents/policies/Provincial%20Policy.pdf  (accessed 20 
September 2019).   
348  NWPG: Finance Estimates of Provincial Revenue and Expenditure 2019/20 (2019) 273. 
349  NWPG: Finance (2019) 273. 
350  NWPG: Finance ‘Presentation to NCOP Ad Hoc Committee: NW DLGHS Section 100(1)(a) Intervention’ 
(2018) 5 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west 
1.amazonaws.com/180627MEC_GF_Gaolaolwe.pdf (accessed 20 September 2019).  
351  NWPG: Finance (2019) 273.  
352  NWPG: Finance (2019) 273.  
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The department of finance, together with the provincial treasury, have been assisting 
municipalities to adopt the funded budgets as required by section 18 of the MFMA.353 
Additionally, in 2018, the department made several interventions and assisted the affected 
municipalities to negotiate settlement of their debts with creditors who supply bulk services, 
namely; Eskom and Sedibeng Water Board.354 This was done by signing payment arrangement 
agreements with these creditors.355 However, this has not yielded any positive outcomes since 
there are some of the municipalities in the province that are still overly indebted. The Ditsobotla 
municipality, which owes Eskom an estimated amount of R305 million,356 is one and the 
Mahikeng municipality, which owes the Sedibeng Water Board an amount estimated above 
R50 million,357 is another.  
Moreover, the department of local government has been acting in line with its responsibilities 
in terms of the joint intervention agreement it entered into in 2018 with the department of 
finance and provincial treasury.358 One of those responsibilities is to facilitate capacity building 
programmes for municipality’s oversight structures, such as the MPAC and internal audit 
committees.359 This programme started on July 2018.360 The department has also been 
monitoring the appointment of senior managers in municipalities to fill up the identified 
vacancies during the same period.  
In 2015, responding to poor audit outcomes, the department of finance also deployed technical 
advisors to ‘priority municipalities’ to support their incompetent staff in key areas such as 
finance, supply chain and procurement, as well as performance systems.361 However, despite 
all these attempts, the state of performance in municipalities (particularly in financial aspect) 
is on a downward trajectory. The latest (2017/18) audit report attests and highlights that the 
 
353  NWPG: Finance (2019) 273.  
354  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17.  
355  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17.  
356  PMG ‘Eskom debt: hearing with municipalities’ (2018) available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/26651/ (accessed 19 September 2019).  
357  Department of Water & Sanitation (DWS) ‘National Council of Provinces: Question 152 for Oral Reply’ 
(2018) available at http://www.dwa.gov.za/communications/Q&A/2018/NCOP%20152.pdf (accessed 20 
September 2019). 
358  Parliament (2018) 12.  
359  NWPG: Finance (2019) 390. 
360  NWPG: LG ‘Department intensifies its support plan to municipalities’ (2018) available 
http://www.nwpg.gov.za/HumanSettlements/site/media/statements/Department%20intensifies%20its%20sup
port%20plan%20to%20municipalities.pdf (accessed 17 October 2019). See the Terms of Reference here: 
http://www.treasury.nwpg.gov.za/documents/Vacancies/2015/Local%20Government%20Specialist%20Term
s%20of%20reference.pdf (accessed 26 October 2019).  
361  NWPG: Finance (2019) 389-391. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
59 
 
major concern is the non-implementation of audit recommendations by municipalities in order 
to address the identified issues and prevent them from recurring.362   
4.2.2.3. The failing provincial government: Section 100 intervention 
For a better understanding of a terrible regression across municipalities in the North West, it is 
important to first look at the state of performance of a province itself. On May 2018, the 
national executive intervened in the province in terms of section 100(1) of the Constitution.363 
This intervention was occasioned by several governance challenges and dysfunctionality that 
the province encountered, resulting in widespread violent protests.364 Subsequently, the 
national executive deployed the Inter-Ministerial Task Team (IMTT) to the province to conduct 
performance assessments on the then current status across all 13 provincial departments.365  
Following the assessment, the IMTT recommended that 10 departments be placed under 
administration, of which 5 departments were under section 100(1)(a) intervention (issued with 
a directive, less intrusive) and the other 5 departments under section 100(1)(b) intervention 
(assumption of responsibility, more intrusive).366 Furthermore, the IMTT made submissions to 
the NCOP on what interventions and support mechanisms were needed for each one of the 10 
departments that were affected. However, the study will only reflect on two departments, 
namely; the department of finance and the department of local government. These two 
departments were both under section 100(1)(a) intervention, meaning that they were issued a 
directive by the national executive.  
4.2.2.3.1. Department of Local Government  
More than 80 percent of the municipalities within the province are technically insolvent and 
unable to meet their financial obligations when they fall due.367 This is so because most of them 
are currently implementing a budget which is not funded, they simply do not have sufficient 
funds to effectively operate.368 One of the major concern is their inability to implement and 
 
362  Consolidated Audit Report 2017/18 (2019) 8-16.  
363  CoGTA ‘Question for Oral Reply: Question 167/2018’ (2018) 1. By then, 20 out of 22 municipalities in the 
province were under section 139 interventions. 
364 Spies D ‘SAHRC condemns violent protest action in the North West’ (2018) available at 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sahrc-condemn-violent-protest-action-in-the-north-west-
20180421 (accessed 19 September 2019).  
365  Parliament of SA ‘Presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee to inquire into the intervention in the North west 
Provincial Government in terms of Section 100 of the Constitution (NCOP)’ (2018) 6-7. 
366  Parliament (2018) 6.  
367  PMG (2019) 6 & 8. 
368  PMG (2019) 5. 
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manage credit control and debt collection, especially on households debtors as they owe an 
amount of R120 million at an average for each municipality.369 As a consequent, the 
municipalities themselves tend to be unable to pay its creditor, more especially Eskom and 
water boards.370 Other municipalities, including Tswaing and Mamusa, are unable to pay third 
party transactions and statutory benefits such as pension funds and medical aids of employees, 
mainly because of cash flow challenges.371 Worst scenario, there are some municipalities that 
have not yet tabled the draft budget and IDPs for 2019/20, Mamusa is one.372 The latter failure 
warrants a dissolution of the council,373 one would wonder why such council is still in 
existence. To say the least, this simply demonstrates how dysfunctionality and lawlessness 
have been normalised in the province. 
4.2.2.3.2. Department of Finance (Provincial Treasury)  
In its key findings, the IMTT noted several major weaknesses in this department. The 
department was reported to have failed in monitoring and supporting municipal finance 
management programs.374 The financial controls within the provincial finance cluster were in 
disarray due to historically accumulated unauthorised and irregular expenditures.375 Moreover, 
the provincial treasury itself did not adequately fulfil its fiscal oversight role. In proposing the 
way forward, the IMTT emphasised the strengthening of MFMA unit, a unit within the 
department of finance. Lastly, it was also proposed that provincial governance structures 
responsible for planning, budgeting management and compliance with audit outcomes of 
municipalities be improved, given the poor local government audit outcomes in the province.376  
4.3. Case study municipalities 
4.3.1. Mahikeng Local Municipality 
The Mahikeng serves a constituency of approximately 314, 394 people.377 This municipality is 
situated within the Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality (NMMDM), with its seat in 
Mafikeng, the capital city of the North West Province. Its council consists of 69 councillors, 
 
369  PMG (2019) 5. 
370  PMG (2019) 3. 
371  PMG (2019) 5. 
372  PMG (2019) 11. 
373  S 139(5)(b) Constitution.  
374  Parliament (2018) 11.  
375  Parliament (2018) 11. 
376  Parliament (2018) 11.  
377  Mahikeng LM Annual Report 2016/17 (2018) 11.  
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of which 35 are ward councillors and 34 proportional representation councillors.378 The 
municipality has a long history of poor audit outcomes. Over the past five years (and beyond), 
it has never obtained an unqualified or clean audit outcome. For financial year 2012/13, it 
obtained a disclaimer of audit opinion.379 For financial year 2013/14, it moved a little bit up 
and obtained a qualified audit opinion.380 In 2014/15, it worsened and regressed again to obtain 
another disclaimer of audit opinion,381 which recurred in 2015/16.382 For 2016/17 financial 
year, the municipality ‘improved’ and obtained a qualified audit opinion.383 All these outcomes 
means that the municipality has been, and still is, in deep financial crisis. The municipality is 
also counted amongst major debtors to water boards.384 In 2018, it owed the Sedibeng Water 
Board an amount of R228 855 994, which is still grappling to settle.385 
4.3.1.1. Internal functioning of a municipality 
An indication was made earlier that the eventual implementation of audit recommendation in 
a municipality is a shared responsibility among various role players. This means that in cases 
of non-implementation, the failure is attributable to all of those involved. These role players 
include the councillors, the Audit Committee, the Mayor and the administrative component.  
4.3.1.1.1. Municipal council 
The Mahikeng council has a long record of dysfunctionality and instability in its composition 
due to political infightings, among other factors.386 The Auditor-General have also noted that 
it has generally failed to adequately oversee the financial and performance reporting, which 
resulted in material misstatements and control deficiencies.387  This negatively affects its ability 
to maintain an effective oversight within the municipality. Concernedly, the municipality is 
currently without strategic policies such as the anti-corruption and fraud prevention strategy, 
as well as for poor procurement practices since the council has failed to adopt them.388 
 
378  Mahikeng (2018) 26. 
379  Mahikeng LM Annual Report 2012/13 (2013) 101. 
380  Mahikeng LM Annual Report 2014/15 (2015) 16. 
381  Mahikeng (2015) 326.  
382  Mahikeng LM Annual Report 2015/16 (2016) 354.  
383  Mahikeng (2018) 327. The 2016/17 report is used as it is the latest, the 2017/18 report is not yet published.  
384  Jordaan N ‘'Most' municipalities that owe water board honouring arrangements’ Sunday Times 9 January 2019. 
385  DWS Written Reply to Question 152 (2018) available at 
http://www.dwa.gov.za/communications/Q&A/2018/NCOP%20152.pdf (accessed 12 October 2019).  
386 Gaedie IJ Assessment of Basic Service Delivery in Mafikeng Local Municipality (unpublished Masters Mini-
thesis, NWU, 2015) 6. 
387  Mahikeng (2018) 334.  
388  Mahikeng (2018) 66 & 156.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
62 
 
Moreover, there has also been the failure to conduct performance assessments as required by 
the MFMA.389 In 2016, the audit committee advised and made recommendations seeking to 
improve internal financial controls and audits, but the council failed to consider and implement 
those recommendations.390 The same occurred in 2017 and 2018.391     
4.3.1.1.1.1. Municipal Public Accounts Committee 
The municipality did not have the MPAC until 2017.392 Since its establishment, the MPAC in 
this municipality has been dysfunctional. In 2018, the head of Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) faced several allegations of fraud and corruption and the MPAC, which is responsible 
for matters concerning discipline, never investigated the said allegations of financial 
misconduct.393 Again in 2017, it failed to launch an investigation in respect of the R144 million 
illegal sale of land for housing project and there is still no municipal official facing disciplinary 
measures in that regard.394  
4.3.1.1.1.2. Finance Committee 
The finance committee has also proven to be ineffective in its monitoring over the CFO when 
the latter performs his/her financial responsibilities. This is so because during the 2016/17 
financial year, the CFO was reported to have failed to implement the recommendations that 
were made by the finance committee. The recommendations were aimed at improving internal 
controls and audits in line with the recommendations made by the Auditor-General. In that 
way, the committee’s failure in its oversight over the CFO had a considerable contribution 
towards the non-implementation of audit recommendations by the latter.   
4.3.1.1.2. Audit Committee 
The mandate of this committee includes, among other things, to advise the council on matters 
concerning internal financial controls and audits.395 Although it is established,396 the committee 
 
389  Mahikeng (2018) 251. See also s 51(d) MSA & s 69 MFMA.  
390  See the committee’s recommendations in page 411 of the Mahikeng 2016/17 Annual Report in juxtaposition 
with the Auditor-General’s findings in page 326 of the same Report. 
391  Mahikeng IDP 2017/18 (2019) section B.  
392  Mahikeng LM IDP 2016/17 (2017) 8.   
393  Mahikeng (2018) 251. 
394  NWPG SCOPA ‘North West Parliament on Mahikeng LM’s failure to investigate R144-million Illegal sale of 
land abandoned housing project in Mahikeng’ available at https://www.gov.za/speeches/north-west-scopa-
lambasts-mahikeng-local-municipality’s-failure-investigate-r144-million (accessed 25 October 2019).  
395  S 166(2)(a) MFMA. See MFMA Circular 32 (2012) 2-4. 
396  See Mahikeng LM (2018) available at https://www.mahikeng.gov.za/induction-of-audit-committee/ (accessed 
03 October 2019). 
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in this municipality is simply not active due to incompetency of its members. For instance, it 
has failed to ensure proper internal financial controls during the 2016/17 financial year, which 
resulted in the municipality incurring an irregular expenditure of R34 630 851.397 This was not 
a new phenomenon in this municipality, it has been the case over the years.398  
4.3.1.1.3. The Mayor 
Generally, there seem to be no trace of record pointing to the Mahikeng Mayor’s adherence to 
her legal duties. She is required to conduct the general monitoring and provide general political 
guidance over fiscal and financial affairs of the municipalities. In doing so, she may monitor 
and oversee the exercise of responsibilities assigned in terms of the MFMA to the MM and the 
CFO. However, as will be shown in the next section, the Mayor has generally failed to fulfil 
her role to monitor and guide the MM and the CFO since these two offices have encountered 
several challenges and failures. In addition, the Mayor has to identify financial problems facing 
the municipality and ensure that the preventive measures recommended by either by MPAC, 
finance committee or audit committee, are accordingly given effect.399 However, it has already 
been pointed out that the recommendations of the audit committee were previously ignored by 
the CFO and no disciplinary measures were taken in that regard. In 2018, dissatisfied with the 
Mayor’s performance, the Democratic Alliance (DA) tabled a motion of no confidence against 
the Mayor on the basis of her incompetency and inability to effectively execute her legal duties 
and responsibilities.400 However, the motion of no confidence did not succeed.  
4.3.1.1.4. Administration 
4.3.1.1.3.1. Municipal Manager 
Since 2013, the MM has been failing to ensure a fair presentation of accurate financial records 
to the Auditor-General, hence Mahikeng has been obtaining disclaimers and qualified audit 
opinions.401 Apart from this, the MM has also been failing to effect consequences in terms of 
section 32(2)(b) of the MFMA, which requires the recovery of unauthorised, irregular, fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure from municipal official liable for it, unless such expenditure is written 
 
397  Mahikeng (2018) 329.   
398  Mahikeng (2015) 329. 
399  S 54(1)(e) MFMA. 
400  Mothibedi L ‘Mahikeng Municipality mayor survives motion of no confidence’ (2018) available at 
http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/mahikeng-municipality-mayor-survives-motion-of-no-confidence/ 
(accessed 14 October 2019).  
401  Mahikeng (2018) 23 & 327.  
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off or declared irrecoverable by the council following the investigations. The Auditor-General 
reported that no investigation was made in line with the latter provision to determine if any 
official was liable for the R34 630 851 irregular expenditure, as well as fruitless and wasteful 
expenditures incurred by the municipality.402 In 2017, the MM admitted his failure to ensure 
consequence management in respect of the R144 million illegal sale of land abandoned housing 
project in Mahikeng.403 The MM was also found to have failed in ensuring the implementation 
of adequate monitoring controls throughout the year and also failed to report.404    
Furthermore, there has also been a number of internal control deficiencies noted in this 
municipality. To mention a few, in 2014, the MM was suspended due to his failure to properly 
account for the R1.5 billion unauthorised and irregular expenditure that was incurred by the 
municipality over a single financial year (2013/14).405 Another suspension of the MM occurred 
in 2018. This time around the suspension was based on the MM’s unilateral decision to invest 
an amount of R83 million into the embattled VBS bank in contravention with the relevant 
provisions of the MFMA.406 Following his suspension, the MM and other perpetrators were 
also criminally charged with fraud and corruption,407 and the current MM is acting.  
4.3.1.1.3.2. Chief Financial Officer 
The MFMA requires the CFO to advise and assist the MM in carrying out his or her financial 
management responsibilities, including budget planning, financial reporting and monitoring 
the implementation plan for internal and external audit recommendations. The Mahikeng CFO 
is clearly not adequately fulfilling his monitoring role in this regard and this is evident from 
the non-implementation of audit recommendations in the municipality.408 In 2016, the audit 
 
402  Mahikeng (2018) 334. 
403  NWPG SCOPA (2017). 
404  Mahikeng (2018) 335. 
405  News24 ‘Mahikeng municipal manager suspended’ (2013) available at 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Mahikeng-municipal-manager-suspended-20141022 (accessed 
15 October 2019). 
406  SA Government ‘North West on forensic investigation regarding VBS investment’ (2018) available at 
https://www.gov.za/speeches/findings-forensic-investigation-nw-municipalities%E2%80%99-vbs-
investment-24-oct-2018-0000 (accessed 14 October 2019).  
407  IOL News ‘Municipal officials suspended, charged over #VBSBankHeist’ (2018) available at 
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/municipal-officials-suspended-charged-over-vbsbankheist-
17606809 (14 October 2019). 
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committee advised and made recommendations seeking to improve internal financial controls 
and audits to the CFO and the latter just ignored them.409  
In 2017, the CFO failed to ensure that the internal controls were implemented and this failure 
resulted in the municipality incurring a loss of R139 million that was not recoverable from a 
bankrupt company.410 This emanated from an illegal sale of land. In 2018, following the 
incident of illegal investment into VBS Bank as discussed above, the CFO resigned for 
unknown reasons, perhaps in an attempt of evading the criminal charges of fraud and 
corruption.411 To date, there is little in the way of documented evidence that the responsible 
official was accordingly dealt with.  
4.3.1.1.3.3. Internal Audit Unit 
This unit must advise the MM and report to the audit committee on the implementation of the 
internal audit plan, as well as on any other matter in relation to internal controls and audit, 
compliance, risk and risk management.412 However, the Mahikeng internal audit unit is 
generally ineffective. In 2017, the unit failed to effectively monitor the implementation of 
action plan to address the issues raised in the audit reports, and the Auditor-General reported 
that this failure has been consistent over the past 4 years.413 In 2018, the Auditor-General 
indicated that the internal audit unit was generally ineffective, while the audit committee failed 
to effectively monitor action plan to address the previous year’s audit findings.414     
4.3.1.2. Provincial government 
4.3.1.2.1. Support 
In 2017, the MEC for local government in conjunction with the provincial treasury devised the 
PAAP support programme.415 The aim of this programme is to assist the ‘priority 
municipalities’, including Mahikeng, to effectively deal with poor audit outcomes.416 A 
detailed discussion on this has already been made in section 4.2.2.1. above. Before the PAAP 
 
409  See the committee’s recommendations on page 411 of the Mahikeng 2016/17 Annual Report in juxtaposition 
with the Auditor-General’s findings on page 326 of the same Report.  
410  NWPG SCOPA (2017). 
411  Kekana M ‘Municipalities to feel the heat over VBS investments’ (2019) available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2018-10-23-municipalities-to-feel-the-heat-over-vbs-investments (accessed 16 
October 2019). 
412  S 165(2)(b) MFMA. 
413  Mahikeng (2018) 335. 
414  Mahikeng (2018) 335.  
415  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17. 
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came into existence, disappointingly, the provincial government never took any step to improve 
the financial performance in municipalities, hence the problem developed to this crisis stage. 
In 2018, the provincial treasury assisted the municipality to negotiating the settlement of its 
debt with Sedibeng Water Board.417 This was through drafting of payment arrangement 
contracts with Sedibeng.418 The municipality has also benefitted from other capacity building 
programmes that the MEC of finance arranged for all the municipalities in the province.419   
4.3.1.2.2. Interventions 
The Mahikeng municipality has encountered five interventions (2003, 2004, 2010, 2016 and 
2018) in terms of section 139 of the Constitution.420 In all these years, the same reasons for the 
intervention, ranging from governance, financial mismanagement and service delivery 
backlogs, have been recurring. The Auditor-General annually provides recommendations for 
improvement, but then the recurrence could only mean one thing, namely that those 
recommendations are simply ignored.421 Table 2 below provides a breakdown of interventions 
in this municipality. 
 
417  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17.  
418  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17.  
419  SA Government ‘North West Treasury on failure of municipal CFOs attendance of forum’ (2019) available at 
https://www.gov.za/speeches/north-west-treasury-failure-municipal-cfo’s-non-attendance-forum-23-sep-
2019-0000 (accessed 26 October 2019).  
420  Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 158-160. See also November J The Role of Provinces in the use of 
Interventions in terms of Section 139(1)(a)-(c) of the Constitution (unpublished LLM research-paper, UWC, 
2015) 38. See also NCOP archives, available at https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/NCOP-
Interventions/20170707.pdf (accessed 16 September 2019).  
421  This problem spans over various election periods hence reflecting a change in political leadership. This 
suggests that the recurrence goes deeper than just willingness to act and brings out systemic/institutional 
challenges/ineffectiveness. It might be necessary to mention that the ANC has been the ruling party in this 
municipality since 2000. 
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Table 3: Breakdown of interventions in Mahikeng LM (2000-2019) 
Source: Author’s construct (2019).422 
4.3.1.3. National government 
In 2018, the CoGTA and NT identified what they call ‘12 priority municipalities’ in the 
province, to which Mahikeng is one.423 These municipalities are dysfunctional and at the brink 
of collapse. The CoGTA’s support and interventionary programmes to these municipalities 
focuses on three broad areas, namely; governance and administration; financial management 
and service delivery.424 For Mahikeng in particular, the NT has also requested the municipality 
to present its state of financial affairs, particularly its debt to Sedibeng Water Board.425 The 
latter was done in a view of assisting the municipality in drafting payment settlement agreement 
with Sedibeng.426 The CoGTA has also established an Advisory Panel to coordinate and help 
 
422  Various sources were consulted in constructing this table, including the PMG publications, NCOP & CoGTA 
notices & reports; municipality’s annual reports; NWPG notices & reports; municipality’s audit reports; 
Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 158-160 & November (2015) 38. 
423  CoGTA (2018). 
424  CoGTA (2018).  
425  CoGTA (2018).  
426  CoGTA (2018).  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
68 
 
in this regard.427 Before 2018, no supervisory measures were noted from the national 
government. 
Furthermore, between the 2017-2018 periods, the NT visited some municipalities in the North 
West to monitor their progress in relation to the implementation of the adopted budgets,428 
audit action and service delivery plans.429 Mahikeng was one of those municipalities. 
Subsequently, the NT and CoGTA deployed technical advisors to these municipalities to 
complete assessments and resolve identified problems in audit reports.430  
4.3.1.4. Other institutions 
Subsequent to the MM’s suspension due to irregular investment into VBS Bank in 2018, the 
SAPS accepted and investigated criminal charges of fraud and corruption against him and other 
perpetrators who were involved and the case is ongoing.431 Also, in 2009, the former President 
Jacob Zuma signed a presidential proclamation mandating the SIU to investigate 24 North West 
municipalities that were alleged of high risk corruption incidents.432 Mahikeng was one. 
Although the SIU managed to recover some misappropriated funds from certain councillors, 
some of the issues were beyond its jurisdiction and had to refer them to the Hawks for further 
probing.433 Since 2013, nothing has happened.  
4.3.2. Ditsobotla Local Municipality 
The Ditsobotla is under the NMMDM, with its seat in Lichtenburg. It serves a constituency of 
approximately 168,902 people.434 Its council consists of 40 members, of which 20 are ward 
councillors and the other 20 proportional representation councillors. Like Mahikeng, this 
municipality has a long history of poor audit outcomes. Over the past five years, and beyond 
that, it has never obtained an unqualified audit outcome. For the financial years 2012/13,435 
2013/14,436 and 2014/15,437 it has been obtaining a disclaimer of audit opinion. During the 
 
427  CoGTA (2018). 
428  S 129(4) Constitution.  
429  CoGTA Annual Report 2017/18 Financial Year (2019) 43-44. 
430  CoGTA (2019) 44.  
431  IOL News ‘Municipal officials suspended, charged over #VBSBankHeist’ (2018) available at 
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/municipal-officials-suspended-charged-over-vbsbankheist-
17606809 (14 October 2019). 
432  PMG ‘SIU findings on North West Municipalities’ (2012) available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/14873/ (accessed 28 October 2019).  
433  PMG (2012).    
434  Ditsobotla LM Annual Report 2017/18 (2019) 15. 
435  Ditsobotla LM Annual Report 2012/13 (2013) 17.  
436  Ditsobotla LM Annual Report 2013/14 (2014) 18. 
437  Ditsobotla LM Annual Report 2014/15 (2015) 17.  
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2015/16 financial year, it ‘improved’ to a qualified audit opinion.438 It then regressed again to 
a disclaimer of audit opinion in 2016/17,439 which recurred in 2017/18 financial year.440  
This trail of disclaimed audit opinions means nothing other than that the municipality is in deep 
financial crisis and at the brink of collapsing. Ditsobotla is amongst the top ten Eskom debtor’s 
in the country. In 2015, it owed Eskom an amount over R100 million and this debt is 
escalating.441 
4.3.2.1. Internal functioning of a municipality 
The three key actors in the implementation of audit recommendations in Ditsobotla is obviously 
the municipal council, together with its MPAC, the Mayor and the administrative component, 
comprising of the MM, CFO and internal audit unit (although poorly functional). Strikingly, 
unlike Mahikeng, Ditsobotla does not have the Audit Committee.442 
4.3.2.1.1. Municipal council 
The fact is that the Ditsobotla council is dysfunctional.443 It continues to battle with an issue of 
instability in its composition and this is mainly due to suspensions and resignations that are 
often politically concocted.444 This weakens oversight mechanism within the municipality. 
Despite several allegations of fraud and corruption against some municipal officials, the 
council is still reluctant to adopt fraud prevention and anti-corruption strategy.445 The Auditor-
General has also indicated that the municipal leadership is generally failing to recruit 
appropriately skilled workforce in key positions of finance performance and compliance units 
of the municipality.446 As a result, the municipality tends to excessively rely on external 
consultants, with exorbitant service fees, to compile financial statements and other information 
for audit purposes.  
 
438  Ditsobotla LM Annual Report 2015/16 (2017) 132.  
439  Ditsobotla LM Annual Report 2016/17 (2018) 132. 
440  Ditsobotla (2019) 132-142.  
441  Tau P ‘Ditsobotla’s problems blamed on acting head’ (2016) available at 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ditsobotlas-problems-blamed-on-acting-head-20161210 
(accessed 16 October 2019).  
442  PMG ‘Report of the Selection Committee on CoGTA Inspection Loco on Notice of Intervention in Ditsobotla 
LM’ (2019) available at https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/3674/ (accessed 28 October 2019).  
443  CoGTA ‘List of dysfunctional and distressed municipalities’ (2018) available at 
http://www.cogta.gov.za/?p=4088 (accessed 28 October 2019).  
444  Ditsobotla (2019) 28. 
445  Ditsobotla (2019) 28. 
446  Ditsobotla (2019) 145.  
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Moreover, the 2016/17 annual report was not tabled on time before the municipal council as 
required by section 127(2) of the MFMA and the council failed to adopt an oversight report in 
terms of section 129(1) of the MFMA during the same year.447 Besides an ineffective MPAC, 
the council has also failed to establish the finance committee to assist it with oversight, and the 
audit committee is also not established.448  
4.3.2.1.1.1. Municipal Public Accounts Committee 
The Ditsobotla council established its MPAC in 2011.449 This is the only committee it has in 
terms of section 79 of the Structures Act. However, the MPAC, just like the council, is 
dysfunctional. The MPAC acknowledged its ineffectiveness in the 2016/17 oversight report, 
highlighting that it does not have ‘basic tools of trade as well as appropriate personnel’ to 
effectively function.450 The ineffectiveness of MPAC, as well as the absence of audit committee 
and finance committee, makes it difficult for this municipality to improve on financial controls 
and it also negatively affects the general oversight cycle.451 This also explains the trail of 
disclaimed and qualified audit findings the municipality has been obtaining since 2000.  
4.3.2.1.2. The Mayor 
The Mayor is required to monitor the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipalities. In that 
process, he/she may monitor and oversee the exercise of legal duties and responsibilities 
assigned to the MM and the CFO. However, this has not been done (or has been done 
ineffectively) in Ditsobotla. The fact that the municipality has obtained five disclaimer of audit 
opinions over the past six years, and that its debt to Eskom is mounting up, clearly shows that 
the municipality has reached a point of financial crisis. The concern is that the Mayor is doing 
nothing about it and he is continuously failing to monitor the MM and CFO in their exercise of 
legal duties. There is little in the way of documented evidence, even in the latest annual report 
of the municipality (2017/18) itself, that the Mayor has previously took any efforts taken to 
secure and sustain a sound and healthy financial status of the municipality. The Ditsobotla 
constituency can no longer bear with his ineptitude, hence they held him hostage in 2017.452 
 
447  Ditsobotla (2019) 142. 
448  Ditsobotla (2019) 24.  
449  Presentation by NW CoGTA (2012) available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/120904nwest_0.ppt (accessed 28 October 2019).  
450  Ditsobotla LM MPAC Oversight Report 2016/17 (2018) 8.   
451  Ditsobotla MPAC (2018) para 7.  
452  News24 ‘Mayor held hostage outside Coligny’ (2017) available at 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mayor-held-hostage-outside-coligny-police-20170524 (accessed 
26 October 2019).  
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Historically, there has always been instability in this office. For instance, in 2013, the then 
Mayor, Lesego Holele, was removed through a motion of no confidence, only to be restated 
after 3 months.453  
4.3.2.1.3. Administration 
4.3.2.1.3.1. Municipal Manager 
The municipality has not been fully cooperating with the Auditor-General by ensuring a fair 
presentation of its accurate financial records,454 hence it has consistently been obtaining 
disclaimer of audit opinions.455 The latter is the responsibility of the MM and therefore he has 
failed in one of his legal duties. Moreover, the MM has on several occasions reported to have 
failed in effecting consequences against cases of financial misconduct and irregularities. For 
instance, during 2017/18 financial year, the municipality incurred an unauthorised expenditure 
of R38 186 563, irregular expenditure of R8 476 149, as well as fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure of R53 620 717, and yet no investigation was conducted with a view of identifying 
the responsible officials so that the recovery of this loss can be made, as required by section 
32(2)(a),(b) & (c) of the MFMA.456 The Auditor-General notes that ‘similar non-compliance 
was also reported in the previous years’,457 albeit with different amount of money involved.  
The MM position also has a long history of instability. In 2013, Justin Bhine was appointed as 
the MM, albeit contrary to recruitment processes for senior officials, with no experience and 
relevant qualifications.458 In 2015, from August to November, Solomon Nnete was the acting 
MM.459 In his four-month long acting, Nnete suspended the CFO on account of corruption 
claims after the latter was alleged to have solicited a bribe from a service provider to the 
municipality in order to secure a tender.460 On 17 November 2015, Monde Juta was appointed 
 
453  Tau P ‘Jobs for pals is sinking NW municipalities’ (2013) available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/jobs-
for-pals-is-sinking-nw-municipalities-1511756 (accessed 16 November 2019).  
454  Ditsobotla (2019) 142.  
455  Ditsobotla (2019) 132.  
456  S 32(2)(b) of the MFMA. 
457  Ditsobotla (2019) 142. 
458  Tau (2013).  
459  Stone S ‘Bribery scandal: Official suspended for ‘not disclosing previous allegations of corruption’ (2015) 
available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/bribery-scandal-official-suspended-for-not-
disclosing-previous-allegations-of-corruption-20151117 (accessed 16 November 20190.  
460  Corruption Watch ‘Businessman blows the whistle on corrupt officials’ (2015) available at 
https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/businessman-blows-the-whistle-on-corrupt-officials/ (accessed 16 
November 2019).  
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as the acting MM, thus replacing Nnete.461 Juta’s appointment was also controversial since he 
was reported to have faked his qualifications and his character also being questioned, given 
that he was previously suspended on two occasions as the MM of the Madibeng Local 
Municipality on allegations of several irregularities, corruption and fraud.462  
4.3.2.1.3.2. Chief Financial Officer 
The CFO is required to advise and assist the MM in carrying out his or her financial 
management responsibilities, ranging from financial reporting as well as monitoring of the 
implementation plan for internal and external audit recommendations.463 However, the CFO of 
Ditsobotla is not fulfilling this legal duty. In 2017/18, he failed put in place a system for liability 
management and, during the same year, he has also failed to monitor the implementation of 
internal audit plan.464  
The Auditor-General also indicates in this regard that ‘similar non-compliances were also 
reported during the previous years’.465 In 2015, the CFO (Leeto Dintwe) was suspended on 
account of corruption allegations that he has solicited a bribe from a service provider to the 
municipality in order to secure a tender.466 However, he successfully challenged his suspension 
before the Labour Court.467  
4.3.2.1.3.3. Internal Audit Unit 
Section 165(2)(b) of the MFMA requires this unit to advise on and make recommendations for 
the improvement of financial controls and internal audit related matters. However, the Auditor-
General indicates in his report that there was no internal audit for the financial year 2017/18 in 
this municipality.468 In addition, this means that the unit has also failed in ensuring the 
implementation of an internal audit plan so as to address the issues raised in the audit report. 
The Auditor-General concernedly noted that this failure has been recurring since 2012/13.469 
 
461  Dintwe (2016) para 6.  
462  Tau (2016). 
463  S 81(1)(d)-(e) MFMA. 
464  Ditsobotla (2019) 24.  
465  Ditsobotla (2019) 143. 
466  Corruption Watch ‘Businessman blows the whistle on corrupt officials’ (2015) available at 
https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/businessman-blows-the-whistle-on-corrupt-officials/ (accessed 16 
November 2019).  
467  Leeto Jeremiah Dintwe v Ditsobotla Local Municipality & Another (J65/16) [2016] ZALC (1 February 2016). 
468  Ditsobotla (2019) 24. 
469  Ditsobotla (2019) 24. 
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4.3.2.2. Provincial government 
4.3.2.2.1. Support  
The Ditsobotla was also targeted by the 2017 PAAP support programme by the MEC for local 
government and the provincial treasury.470 The aim of this programme is to assist the ‘priority 
municipalities’ to effectively deal with poor audit outcomes.471 A detailed discussion on this 
has already been made in section 4.2.2.1. In 2018, the provincial treasury assisted the 
municipality to negotiating the settlement of its debt with Eskom.472 This was through payment 
arrangement agreements with Eskom.473 Other forms of support include those discussed in 
section 4.2.1 above, since those measures were general. The municipality also participated on 
the capacity building programme that the MEC of finance arranged for all the municipalities 
in the province, of which the recent one was arranged for CFOs.474  
4.3.2.2.2. Interventions 
The Ditsobotla is currently under section 139 intervention.475 Since 2000, this municipality 
experienced three provincial interventions, for the first time in 2013, followed by 2016 and 
2018 (to date).476 Among other reasons for the intervention, recurrence of poor audit outcomes, 
financial mismanagement and service delivery backlogs are worth mentioning. An overview 
of the provincial interventions in this municipality is presented in the table 3 below. 
  
 
470  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17. 
471  NWPG: Treasury (2017) 2. 
472  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17.  
473  NWPG: Finance (2018) 17.  
474  SA Government ‘NW Treasury on failure of municipal CFOs attendance of forum’ (2019) available at 
https://www.gov.za/speeches/north-west-treasury-failure-municipal-cfo’s-non-attendance-forum-23-sep-
2019-0000 (accessed 26 October 2019).  
475  AGSA (2019) 14. 
476  Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 158-160. See also November (2015) 38.   
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Table 4: Breakdown of interventions in Ditsobotla LM (2000-2019) 
 
Source: Author’s construct (2019).477 
4.3.2.3. National government 
The Ditsobotla is one of the 12 priority municipalities that the CoGTA identified as 
municipalities needing strong support from the national government.478 As already discussed, 
the CoGTA and the NT seek to support these municipalities in three broad areas, governance 
and administration; financial management and service delivery.479 In 2015, the NT took a 
decision to withhold the transfer of equitable share from municipalities until formal 
arrangements have been made with their creditors, particularly Eskom.480 Given its growing 
culture of non-payment to Eskom, of which the Auditor-General also noted as a concern, the 
Ditsobotla was one of those municipalities. However, ‘no improvements have been observed 
and the debt continues to grow’.481 
 
477  Ditsobotla LM audit reports; Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 158-160 & November (2015) 38.  
478  CoGTA (2018).  
479  CoGTA (2018).  
480 Steyn L ‘Councils told to pay Eskom or else’ Mail & Guardian 10 April 2015 available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2015-04-09-councils-told-to-pay-eskom-or-else (accessed 17 October 2019). See NT 
‘NT withholds transfers of funds to 60 municipalities’ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2015/20150331%20%20National%20Treasury%20Withhold
s%20Transfer%20of%20Funds%20to%2060%20Municipalities.pdf (accessed 17 October 2019).  
481 Fin24 ‘Debt from municipalities has only grown, Eskom laments’ available at 
https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Eskom/debt-from-municipalities-has-only-grown-eskom-laments-20190624 
(accessed 26 October 2019). 
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4.3.2.4. Other institutions 
In 2018, the Hawks conducted an investigation in Ditsobotla after having received a report of 
allegations of fraud and corruption against certain municipal officials.482 In July 2019, the 
North West Premier, Job Mokgoro, proclaimed the institution of forensic investigation by the 
SIU into the financial affairs of the municipality and the investigations are ongoing.483 Lastly, 
the SAPS has also deployed some of its members to the Ditsobotla municipal offices to secure 
the Administrator since he was threatened by the councillors who were opposing section 139(1) 
intervention into the municipality.484  
4.3.3. Tswaing Local Municipality 
Tswaing municipality serves a constituency of approximately 130, 478 people.485 It is situated 
within the NMMDM, with its seat in Delareyville. Its council consists of 29 councillors, of 
which 15 are ward councillors and 14 proportional representation councillors.486 Like the other 
two case studies, Tswaing has a long history of poor audit outcomes. It has never obtained an 
unqualified audit outcome over the past six years and beyond. For the financial years 
2012/13,487 2013/14,488 and 2014/15,489 it sustained a disclaimer of audit opinion. It then went 
up to a qualified audit opinion during the financial years 2015/16,490 2016/17,491 and 2017/18 
(latest).492 Discernible from the latter trend is that the municipality has been and still is in deep 
financial distress. Further proof to this is that the municipality was even unable to pay its staff 
 
482  Eyewitness News ‘Hawks probing Ditsobotla Municipality after revelations of corruption’ available at 
https://ewn.co.za/2018/05/24/hawks-probing-ditsobotla-municipality-after-revelations-of-corruption 
(accessed 28 October 2019).  
483  NWPG: Premier ‘SOPA Debate Response’ available at http://premier.nwpg.gov.za/newpremier/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/SOPA-DEBATE-RESPONSE-04-JULY-2019.pdf (accessed 28 October 2019).  
484  News24 ‘Ditsobotla municipality denies claims it barred administrator from entering its premises‘ available 
at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ditsobotla-municipality-denies-claims-it-barred-
administrator-from-entering-its-premises-20190704 (accessed 28 October 2019).  
485  Tswaing LM Annual Report 2017/18 (2019) 9.  
486  Tswaing (2019) 21-23. 
487  Tswaing LM Annual Report 2012/13 (2013) 161. 
488  Tswaing LM Annual Report 2013/14 (2014) 148. 
489  Tswaing LM Annual Report 2014/15 (2016) 144.    
490  Tswaing LM Annual Report 2015/16 (2017) 148. 
491  Tswaing LM Annual Report 2016/17 (2018) 162. 
492  Tswaing (2019) 147. 
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for two months in 2019,493 and some of its assets were attached after it ignored a court order to 
settle a debt it owed to an aggrieved service provider.494  
Tswaing is also overly indebted to Eskom, with no hope for complete settlement of debt 
anytime soon.495 Although not openly aired, this municipality seem to be favoured by top 
leadership of the ANC. Its senior municipal officials, who tend to fail in their duties during 
their tenure, are often elevated to provincial and national ranks of leadership. For instance, 
Dakota Legoete, the former MM, is currently occupying leadership position within the ANC 
at national level. Also, Manketsi Tlhape, the former Mayor, was appointed as the MEC for 
local government in the province in 2013.496 
4.3.3.1. Internal functioning in a municipality 
4.3.3.1.1. Municipal council 
The Tswaing council has generally failed to observe the principles of good governance within 
the municipality. It has a backlog of over nine financial years of oversight reports, and this is 
in contravention of section 129 of the MFMA.497 Moreover, the council is reluctant to establish 
other oversight committees (i.e. finance committee) in terms of section 79 of the Structures Act 
to assist it with oversight role by, among other things, dealing with matters concerning 
competency of audit, risk management, discipline and financial controls.498 The audit report 
indicates that the council failed in its oversight role and in the implementation of post audit 
action plans to address the previous adverse audit findings.499 Further concern was noted that 
it has failed to take effective measures in preventing irregular expenditure of R31 098 699 as 
well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure of R13 156 445, as required by section 62(1)(d) of 
the MFMA. Furthermore, there is also poor oversight over administration due to municipal 
 
493  Moerane B ‘Tswaing Local Municipality workers not paid, services halted’ SABC News 2 July 2019 online 
available at http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/tswaing-local-municipality-workers-not-paid-services-
halted/ (accessed 14 October 2019).  
494  Moerane (2019). 
495  The Citizen ‘Nafcoc wants Tswaing municipality in North West disbanded’ available at 
https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2154685/nafcoc-wants-tswaing-municipality-in-north-west-
disbanded/ (15 October 2019).  
496  IOL News ‘Outcry as ‘bad’ ex-mayor gets MEC post’ https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/outcry-as-bad-ex-
mayor-gets-mec-post-1539943 (15 October 2019).  
497  PMG ‘Memorandum’ 29 May 2019 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/190723masondo.pdf (accessed 17 October 2019). 
498  Kraai, Holtzhausen & Malan (2017) 63.  
499  Tswaing (2019) 157.  
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council being divided in decision making.500 The Auditor-General has also expressed his 
dissatisfaction in relation to unskilled staff in key positions such as SCM, compliance and 
finance units.501 The municipal leadership fails to recruit competent personnel.  
4.3.3.1.1.1. Municipal Public Accounts Committee 
The Tswaing MPAC was established in 2011 and is the only committee of council established 
in terms of section 79 of the Structures Act.502 The fact is that the MPAC in this municipality 
is ineffective, it has never tabled its oversight report.503 There is also an instability in its 
composition, with the latest restructuring having occurred in December 2018.504 The MEC of 
local government has noted the challenges of this committee, including that its members do not 
attend meetings and as result, the numbers do not quorate for the decisions to be taken on 
recommendations to be made to the council.505   
4.3.3.1.2. The Mayor 
The Mayor is required to monitor the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipalities. Like it 
is with the other two case studies, there is no record of the efforts taken by the Tswaing 
municipality to improve the financial performance of the municipality by ensuring proper 
monitoring over the implementation of audit recommendations. Over the past three years, the 
municipality has been obtaining qualified audit outcomes and before that, it retained disclaimer 
of audit.506 Furthermore, the Mayor has failed to identify the financial problems facing the 
municipality and to ensure that the necessary preventive measures are devised to address those 
problems.507 The Auditor-General expressed his dissatisfaction about this state of affairs 
highlighting the failures are recurrent and there is simply no willingness on the leadership to 
act accordingly.508 
 
500  PMG ‘Report on Oversight Visit to Tswaing Local Municipality’ available at https://pmg.org.za/tabled-
committee-report/590/ (accessed 17 October 2019).  
501  Tswaing (2018) 169-172. 
502  Tswaing (2019) 23. 
503  PMG (2019) 4.  
504  PGM (2019) 4. 
505  Tswaing (2019) 23. See also PGM (2019) 4 
506  PGM (2019) 4.  
507  PGM (2019) 4-5. 
508  Tswaing (2018) 170. 
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4.3.3.1.3. Administration 
4.3.3.1.3.1. Municipal Manager 
The audit report notes several issues that are facing the administration of the municipality, 
which is headed by the MM. One of those issues is the non-cooperation of the municipality 
with the Auditor-General by.509 The failure is attributable to the MM. The audit report further 
indicates that the MM has also failed in his duty to install good governance principles within 
the municipality, include the failure to effectively monitor the development and 
implementation of risk management policy, fraud and corruption prevention plan.510 In the 
previous financial years (2014/15 and 2016/17), the MM was again reported to have failed in 
ensuring that sufficient and accurate financial records, which are free from material 
misstatements, are submitted to the Auditor-General, hence resulting in a disclaimer of audit 
opinion.511  
The office of the MM in Tswaing also has a history of instability. In 2009, Dakota Legoete was 
suspended as the MM on allegations of fraud and corruption, the decision he challenged before 
the court.512 In 2015, Shadrack Mere was also suspended as the MM on account of several 
irregularities. Like Legoete, Mere also challenged his suspension before the Labour Court, 
which turned out unsuccessful.513 Dissatisfied by the Labour Court ruling, he then appealed 
before the North West High Court, where he lost again.514  
4.3.3.1.3.2. Chief Financial Officer 
The CFO is required to advise and assist the MM in carrying out his or her financial 
management responsibilities, ranging from financial reporting as well as monitoring of the 
implementation plan for internal and external audit recommendations.515 As already discussed, 
there was no effective monitoring over the implementation of risk management policy, fraud 
and corruption prevention plan in this municipality during the financial years 2014/15, 2016/17 
 
509  Tswaing (2019) 157.  
510  Tswaing (2019) 157. 
511  Tswaing (2018) 162. 
512  Masondo S ‘Dubious officials hired by the state elsewhere’ Sunday Times 25 August 2011 available at 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2011-08-25-dubious-officials-hired-by-the-state-elsewhere/ 
(16 October 2019).  
513  Mere v Tswaing Local Municipality and Another (J1236/15) [2015] ZALCJHB 193.   
514  Mere v Chairperson of the North West Provincial Executive Council and Others (M454/2015) [2017] 
ZANWHC 26 (15 June 2017) paras 34-35. 
515  S 81(1)(d)-(e) MFMA. 
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and 2017/18.516 The implication is that the CFO failed to advise the MM on the effective 
implementation of internal controls. Despite its several failures, unlike the MM, the CFO office 
has been stable over the years. It only encountered one suspension in 2017 where Isaac Moruti 
was suspended as the CFO due to financial irregularities and the current CFO, Stonea Pelele, 
is acting.517 
4.3.3.1.3.3. Internal Audit Unit 
Section 165(2)(b) of the MFMA requires this unit to advise on and make recommendations for 
the improvement of financial controls and internal audit related matters. However, the Auditor-
General indicates in his report that there was no internal audit for the financial year 2017/18 in 
this municipality.518 The municipality did not have an effective risk management system in 
place, of which the internal audit unit is also required to advise the council on its development 
and implementation.519 This suggests the failure on the side of the unit. Similar concerns were 
noted in the previous audit reports. 
4.3.3.2. Provincial government 
4.3.3.2.1. Support 
Tswaing has also benefited from several support programmes from the provincial government, 
as already discussed.520 In May 2016, the MEC for local government deployed a team of 
finance officials to improve the municipality’s financial performance.521 Later in the same year, 
following the intervention in the municipality, two officials were deployed to assume the 
positions of Administrator and the CFO.522 The same support was also given in 2010, and no 
improvement was noted.523 Currently, the municipality is under section 139(1)(b) 
intervention.524 
 
516  Tswaing (2019) 157. 
517  Tswaing LM ‘Finance’ available at http://www.tswaing.gov.za/index.php/departments/finance (accessed 16 
October 2019). 
518  Tswaing (2019) 157. 
519  S 165(2)(b) MFMA.  
520  See para 4.2.1. above.  
521  SA Government ‘North West Local Government on Tswaing municipality financial assistance’ 18 March 2016 
available at https://www.gov.za/nr/node/750132 (accessed 17 October 2019).  
522  SA Government (2016).  
523  PMG ‘Report on Oversight Visit to Tswaing LM’ available at https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-
report/590/ (accessed 17 October 2019).   
524  PMG (2019).  
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4.3.3.2.2. Interventions 
Tswaing has experienced three interventions since its establishment. The first intervention was 
in 2010, followed by 2015 and 2018.525 In all these instances, the interventions were 
necessitated by many issues such as the municipality’s financial mismanagement, 
maladministration, poor governance, service delivery backlogs and lack of capacitated staff.526 
This history is detailed in table 4 below: 
Table 5: Breakdown of interventions in Tswaing LM (2000-2019) 
 
Source: Author’s construct (2019)527  
4.3.3.3. National government 
The Tswaing is one of the 12 priority municipalities identified by the CoGTA as municipalities 
needing strong support from the national government.528 As already discussed above, the 
CoGTA and the NT seek to support these municipalities in three broad areas, governance and 
administration; financial management and service delivery.529 In 2018, the CoGTA deployed 
 
525  Tswaing (2018) 162. See also Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 158-160 & November (2015) 38.  
526  Report of the Select Committee on CoGTA on the Notice of Intervention Issued in terms of Section 139(1)(b) 
of the Constitution in Tswaing LM (01 September 2015).   
527  Tswaing’s annual reports; Greffrath & Van der Waldt (2016) 158-160 & November (2015) 38. 
528  CoGTA (2018).  
529  CoGTA (2018).  
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an Advisory Panel on a site visit to Tswaing and one of the issues the panel was determined to 
resolve was the infrastructure problems, especially the poor sewerage systems.530  
4.3.3.4. Other institutions  
As already indicated above, in 2009, the former President Jacob Zuma signed a presidential 
proclamation mandating the SIU to investigate 24 North West municipalities that were alleged 
of high risk corruption incidents.531 Tswaing was one. Although the SIU managed to recover 
some misappropriated public funds from certain councillors, some of the issues were beyond 
its jurisdiction and had to refer them to the Hawks for further probing.532  
4.4. Emerging trends, causes and challenges 
The deteriorating state of municipalities in the province is attributable to several problems and 
causes. The MEC of local government captured these challenges in the memorandum (dated 
06 May 2019) which was addressed to the NCOP as a notice of section 139(1) intervention in 
seven municipalities in the province.533 This memorandum represents a general status of all 
municipalities in the province. It considers the challenges ranging from governance, 
administration, service delivery and financial management.534 This section seeks to briefly 
reflect on these challenges.  
4.4.1. Financial management issues 
More than 80 percent of the municipalities within the province are technically insolvent and 
unable to meet their financial obligations when they fall due.535 This is so because most of them 
are currently implementing a budget which is not funded, they simply do not have sufficient 
funds to effectively operate.536 One of the major concern is their inability to implement and 
manage credit control and debt collection, especially on households debtors as they owe an 
amount of R120 million at an average for each municipality.537 As a consequence, the 
municipalities themselves tend to be unable to pay its creditors, more especially Eskom and 
 
530  Politics Web ‘COGTA to intervene in dysfunctional municipalities’ 21 June 2018 available at 
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/cogta-to-intervene-at-dysfunctional-municipalities (17 October 2019).  
531  PMG ‘SIU findings on NW Municipalities’ (2012) available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14873/ 
(accessed 28 October 2019).  
532  PMG (2012).    
533  PMG (2019) 1.  
534  PMG (2019) 2. 
535  PMG (2019) 6 & 8. 
536  PMG (2019) 5. 
537  PMG (2019) 5. 
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water boards.538 Other municipalities, including Tswaing and Mamusa, are unable to pay third 
party transactions and statutory benefits such as pension funds and medical aids of employees, 
mainly because of cash flow challenges.539 Worst scenario, there are some municipalities that 
have not yet tabled the draft budget and IDPs for 2019/20, Mamusa being one.540 As the latter 
failure warrants a dissolution of the council,541 one would wonder why such council is still in 
existence. To say the least, this simply demonstrates how dysfunctionality and lawlessness 
have been normalised in the province. 
4.4.2. Governance and administrative issues  
The three case studies discussed above have demonstrated several governance and 
administrative problems facing municipalities. There is often instability within the council due 
to many reasons (including factions) and this, as a result, weakens the effective oversight within 
the municipality.542 There is also instability within the administrative component of the 
municipality and this is due to resignations and suspensions of key senior managers such as the 
MMs and the CFOs.543 This tend to weaken internal controls. The councils are also failing to 
meet their statutory obligations, such as appointing oversight committees and the audit 
committee.544 Important structures such as the MPAC are not functional.545 This happens to be 
the problem in most municipalities not only in the North West, but across the country.546 The 
challenge in establishing and having active MPACs has been ascribed to several issues, such 
as the ambiguity around their composition, the absence of standard procedure for their 
establishment as well as their unclear role and relationship with other municipal structures.547  
In rare cases where MPAC’s composition is stable, non-attendance of members to the meetings 
is an issue since they then struggle to form a quorum in order to take official resolutions and 
 
538  PMG (2019) 3. 
539  PMG (2019) 5. 
540  PMG (2019) 11. 
541  S 139(5)(b) Constitution.  
542  PMG (2019) 2. 
543  PMG (2019) 7 & 9. 
544  PMG (2019) 5.  
545  PMG (2019) 7. 
546  Chonco T ‘Amendment of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act: Is local government finally 
structured for success?’ (2019) 14/1 Local Government Bulletin available at 
https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/local-government-bulletin/volume-14-lgb/municipalities-
are-not-off-the-hook-for-food-security  (01 October 2019).  
547  Botes C Adopting the Public Accounts Committee Model for Financial Oversight in South African 
Municipalities – A Case Study of the Public Accounts Committee in the City of Cape Town (unpublished 
Masters thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2011) 36-37.   
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decisions, and Tswaing is a case in point.548 In relation to audit outcomes, there is no 
municipality in the province that has obtained an unqualified or clean audit. They have 
remained stagnant in terms of improving on audit and the trend has always been, as shown with 
the three case studies above, disclaimer of audit opinion and qualified audit opinion over the 
past two decades.549 While the annual audit reports for each municipality indicate the growing 
large sums of unauthorized, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditures incurred by the 
municipality in previous years, there are usually no investigations to determine if any person 
is liable for those expenditures,550 despite being a requirement in terms of section 32(2)(a) and 
(b) of MFMA. 
4.4.3. Service delivery issues   
Since 2004, South Africa has been engulfed in widespread service delivery protests.551 The 
communities embark on these protests to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the failure by 
municipalities to render basic services such as the provision of water, sanitation, electricity, 
refuse removal, poor maintenance of infrastructure and other issues.552 In giving an overview 
of municipalities in the province, the MEC for local government paints the following grim 
picture:  
Poor delivery of basic services … such as water and sanitation, electricity, infrastructure, … 
service delivery protests, financial [in]viability and … general incapacity and failure to retain 
… skilled human capital who in turn is replaced by unqualified employees ... Among other 
many unresolved issues, this is allegedly the result of some municipalities consecutively 
receiving qualified audit reports and disclaimers.553 
In the Mahikeng, service delivery protests are often sparked by failure to provide water 
services.554 In Tswaing municipality, the most violent service delivery protest that occurred in 
Ottosdal was due to allegations of corruption against some municipal officials that were not 
 
548  PMG (2019) 2.  
549  PMG (2019) 7. 
550  PMG (2019) 7-8. 
551 Alexander P ‘Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis’ (2010) 
37/123 Review of African Political Economy 37. 
552 Roux NL & Nyamukachi PM ‘A reform model for the improvement of municipal service delivery in South 
Africa’ (2005) 40/4 Journal of Public Administration 688. See also Atkinson D ‘Taking to the streets: has 
developmental local government failed in South Africa?’ in Buhlungu S, Daniel J, Southall R et al (eds) State 
of the Nation: South Africa 2007 (2007) ch 2. 
553  Parliament of SA (2019).  
554  Mleya MP An Analysis of Sanitation and Water Service Delivery in Mahikeng Local Municipality 
(unpublished LLM mini-thesis, NWU, 2016) 6-8. 
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investigated. The municipality was in a serious financial distress to an extent that its employees 
were not salaried and some of the service providers were unpaid.555 Lastly, the protests in 
Ditsobotla have often been as a result of, among other things, electricity cut-offs due to 
municipality’s failure to pay Eskom an amount of money estimated at R305 million in 2018.556 
4.4.4. Key findings on the role of provincial and national government 
In respect of the provincial government, a much cannot be said about the effectiveness or 
impact of its interventions and support in the case study municipalities. The evidence, as 
demonstrated thorough case studies, is overwhelming that the North West provincial 
government is failing (of ineffective) in its supervision of municipalities in the province. One 
would not have much expectations on the province to have effective and smooth operating 
municipalities while it is itself failing to get it right, hence section 100 intervention. 
In respect of the national government, as already discussed above, the CoGTA and the NT have 
support programmes for poorly performing municipalities, including the case studies. These 
programmes seek to support the municipalities in three broad areas, governance and 
administration; financial management and service delivery.557 However, the support 
programme is seemingly carried out in a form of one-size-fits-all approach. The problem with 
this approach is that municipalities are not assisted based on their specific needs and demands, 
issues and challenges, but on the basis general state of affairs as with other municipalities.   
4.4.5. Ineffective role by other institutions 
It has been demonstrated in the above case studies that although other involved role-players 
(such as SAPS and SIU) have tried to assist in solving the problem by investigating corruption 
allegations against certain officials, their efforts seem inadequate. For instance, in case of 
Mahikeng, the SAPS has accepted and investigated fraud claims against the MM in 2018 and 
to date, there has never been an outcome report of the investigations. The cause might be of 
lack of resources or sufficient and skilled workforce. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Flowing from chapter three, the current chapter sought to explore the trends in the practice of 
local government in relation to the legal framework for institutional structures and processes 
 
555  Sicetsha (2019).   
556  PMG ‘Eskom debt: hearing with municipalities’ available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/26651/ 
(accessed 19 September 2019).  
557  CoGTA (2018).  
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for the implementation of audit recommendations. The discussions were modelled towards 
answering the question of whether the role players involved in the implementation of audit 
recommendations in municipalities are, in practice, acting in line with their legal duties in that 
regard. The chapter answered the latter question in the context of the North West Province, 
with three case study municipalities.  
First, the chapter commenced with a general discussion on the state of affairs in the province. 
Readily evident was that the state of municipalities in the province is on a downward trajectory. 
The province tried to put in place support measures to circumvent the deterioration. However, 
such measures appear not to have been sufficient or effective since no improvement has been 
noted. The reason for that could probably and arguably be that it is because the province itself 
is failing to get it right, hence the proclamation of section 100 intervention.  
Secondly, three case study municipalities were explored, namely: Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and 
Tswaing. Flowing from these cases studies were many challenges, causes and problems that 
hinders effective implementation of audit reports. From governance and administrative point 
of view, the municipal councils are generally failing to ensure sound oversight mechanism 
within their municipalities. They do not appoint key structures such as the MPAC, Finance 
Committee, Audit Committee and section 79 committees. There are lot of instability in 
councils’ compositions due to politically motivated suspensions and resignations. At times the 
quorum cannot be met to take official resolution to address key issues noted in audit reports 
due to non-attendance to council meetings by councillors. Several irregularities are also 
common to the MMs and the CFOs since they fail to facilitate budget planning, financial 
reporting and monitoring of the implementation plan for internal and external audit 
recommendations.558  Furthermore, the municipalities are in financial distress and this suggests 
that the Mayors are not effectively monitoring and providing political guidance over fiscal and 
financial affairs of the municipalities, let alone overseeing the exercise of responsibilities 
assigned to the MMs and CFOs.559  
Lastly, the chapter also considered general issues common to all municipalities in the province. 
These issues ranges from financial affairs, governance and administration, as well as service 
delivery. In light of the issues emanating from this chapter, the next chapter is set to evaluate 
 
558  S 81(1)(d)-(e) MFMA. 
559  S 52 MFMA. 
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the current legal framework for the implementation of audit recommendations in 
municipalities.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EVALUATING THE SUITABILITY OF LEGAL MEASURES AND OTHER 
FACTORS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATON OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Introduction  
Following on chapter four, this chapter seeks to evaluate the appropriateness of the legal 
framework in dealing with the identified challenges. It also asks whether the real issues lie with 
other factors and main problems that the case studies exposed. These include lack 
of sound financial controls, which leads to service delivery backlogs; governance and 
administrative deficiencies (dysfunctionality of MPACs and absence of Audit Committees); 
inadequate supervisory measures by the provincial and national governments, as well as 
ineffective role by other institutions. Here the question, therefore, is: does the current legal 
framework contribute, through gaps (if any), to any of these problems? If so, can the expanded 
powers of the Auditor-General contribute meaningfully in addressing these problems? In other 
words, will these powers make any difference? In the instance of legal framework not being 
the major cause of these problems, what are the other factors? Is there a legal answer (or real 
practical response) that may contribute in dealing with these issues? The chapter seeks to 
answer these questions, in the same sequential order they are being posed.    
5.2. Gaps and flaws in the legal framework  
Through case studies, several gaps within the legal framework were identified. First is the non-
differentiated auditing standards as applied by the Auditor-General across municipalities. 
Secondly, the dysfunctionality of MPACs and deficiencies around audit committees. Thirdly, 
the challenges and nuances around the provincial intervention powers. Lastly, the one-size-fits-
all approach in the national government’s support programmes towards municipalities. These 
gaps are dealt with separately below. 
5.2.1. Non-differentiation of auditing standards  
An apparent fact is that municipalities vary considerably in many respects, especially in expert 
human resource and financial capacity. Given this, the Auditor-General’s non-differentiated 
approach towards auditing of municipalities tends to be problematic. The key point to be made 
here is that one-size-fits-all application of auditing standards set up to fail the under-resourced 
municipalities, including the three case studies. The audit reports usually contain extensive and 
complex recommendations of which their implementation requires skilled human resource and 
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significant financial and technical capacity. Unfortunately, in Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and 
Tswaing municipalities,560 there is capacity and skills constraints. As a result, this propels 
municipalities to outsource this task to external consultants and this carries a considerable price 
tag (Mahikeng is one example).561 In turn, this causes a serious financial strain on the 
municipality and tends to ‘frequently cause delays in implementing audit recommendations.’562    
5.2.2. Key issues relating to local government legal framework 
5.2.2.1. Dysfunctionality of MPACs 
MPACs are supposed to play an important role in ensuring observance of the Auditor-General’s 
reports. However, this has never happened in respect of three case studies where, although 
established, MPACs were ineffectual.563 The problem is countrywide.564 It is argued that one 
of the main causes for this dysfunctionality is the confusion/uncertainty around, and the 
absence of clear statutory provision on the functions of MPACs. Commendably, clause 24 of 
the Municipal Structures Amendment Bill (B19-2018) clarifies and outlines the mandatory 
functions of MPACs, at the same time allowing the council to also determine further functions. 
However, this is still a Bill and until it has been assented to and signed by the President, the 
problem will persist. Other factors that may also make MPACs more effective include effective 
consequence management and the subjection of errant members (who do not attend to 
committee meetings and programmes) to disciplinary measures. It may also be necessary for 
the SCOPA to provide technical support to MPACs.  
5.2.2.2. Deficiencies around Audit Committees  
Out of the three case studies, only one (Mahikeng) has the audit committee, albeit 
dysfunctional. The other two are clearly in breach of section 166(1) of the MFMA which makes 
it compulsory for a municipality to have an audit committee. The MFMA is silent on what 
should be the solution in this regard. Apart from this, there are other several deficiencies that 
threatens the audit committees’ potential in ensuring observance of audit recommendations. 
Two is noteworthy.  
 
560  See ch 4 para 4.3. 
561  Mahikeng (2016) 8; 20. 
562  Australian National Audit Office Operations of the Australian National Audit Office (2015) 23.   
563  See paras 4.3.1.1.1.1; 4.3.2.1.1.1 & 4.3.3.1.1.1. 
564  Chonco (2019).  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
89 
 
First, while the committee is mainly composed of external members, uncertainty exists as to 
what constitutes the ‘appropriate experience’ requirement for selection.565 While NT crafted 
the guidelines in this regard,566 the council may simply disregard them. As a result, it is upon 
the council to determine the level of experience required. This deficiency, it is argued, 
constitute a point where cadre deployment often ensues. This is evident from Mahikeng case 
study, where the committee is completely dysfunctional, probably due to incompetency. 
Therefore, clearly defined experience requirements will help. 
Secondly, the major concern is that the role of this committee is constrained to an advisory one. 
It lacks the statutory vested powers to require from the municipality’s administration any 
information on, among others, how they implemented the audit plan, internal controls and risk 
management. The composition (largely external) of this committee gives it a more independent 
voice to ensure effective oversight, but this is clogged by its lack of enforcement powers. 
5.2.3. Provincial intervention powers: few challenges  
Given the dire state of affairs in three case studies, and the apparent inefficiency of the 
province’s interventionary efforts to address the problems in a meaningful and sustainable 
manner, it is necessary to dissect few challenges around the provincial intervention powers. 
Aggravating the inefficiency is the fact that there is no detailed regulation to provide the 
practical insights on the application of section 139(1) interventions. This is unlike sections 
139(4) and (5) interventions, which are extensively regulated by the MFMA.567 This lack of 
regulation, as a result, the provision is often misconstrued and incorrectly applied, thus yielding 
no positive outcomes as already demonstrated through case studies.  
For instance, the NWPG has invoked section 139(1) intervention in respect of all three 
municipalities. This is despite the audit report, in respect of each municipality, indicating that 
they are in a serious financial distress, meaning that section 139(5) is most suitably applicable 
in the circumstances as opposed to section 139(1). Furthermore, the problems is even worsened 
by the fact that the province itself is failing to get it right, hence itself is the subject of a section 
100(1) intervention. There is seemingly little funds and resources to provide adequate support 
to these municipalities.   
 
 
565  S 166(4) MFMA.  
566  NT MFMA Circular 65 (2012). 
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5.2.4. Ineffective supervision by the national government 
The three case studies demonstrated that the supervisory measures of the national government 
were often ineffective and thus yielded insignificant outcomes. It is argued that the one-size-
fits-all approach towards most of the municipal support programmes that were provided to 
these case study municipalities by the CoGTA and NT, may be guilty of this inefficiency. The 
uniformity formulation has proven to be problematic, unsustainable and unrealistic given huge 
gaps and discrepancies that exist between municipalities in urban areas and those in deep rural 
areas, such as Tswaing.  
The call for differentiation approach is well-timed and has since garnered more support from 
various scholars. For instance, Steytler correctly observes that the differentiated approach ‘may 
accommodate the diversity of capacity found in municipalities by issuing asymmetrical 
regulations.’568 Koma concurs and points out that the differentiated approach and nature of 
municipal support initiatives may accommodate and set free rural municipalities from the 
complexities of compliance with standardised performance standards that far surpasses their 
capacity to implement.569  
5.3. Auditor-General’s expanded powers: a renewed hope or a new myth?  
Given the identified problems, the question then is: will the Auditor-General’s additional 
powers to make referrals, remedial action and impose liability through certificate of debt make 
any difference in the context of three case studies? The study doubts and argues that these 
powers do not constitute a magic bullet solution to the identified problems. These powers are 
dealt with separately below, each followed by a brief assessment. 
5.3.1. Referral of suspected material irregularity 
Section 5(1A) of the PAAA empowers the Auditor-General to refer any suspected material 
irregularity to a relevant public investigative body and such body is required to inform the 
Auditor-General of the progress and the outcome of the investigation. Material irregularity is 
an open-ended concept which encompasses fraud and theft, financial mismanagement, 
maladministration and any non-compliance with, or breach of legislation.570 Furthermore, the 
investigative body is any ‘authority with requisite investigative capacity and skills including 
 
568  Steytler N Paper III: The Strangulation of Local Government (2008) 10-11. 
569  Koma SB ‘The state of local government in South Africa: issues, trends and options’ (2010) 45/1 Journal of 
Public Administration 118. 
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the PP, SIU and the SAPS’.571 The process of referral is quite lengthy and the diagram below 
best illustrates how it flows.  
Figure 3: Auditor-General’s referral process  
 
Source: AGSA (2019). 
5.3.1.1. Assessment 
The Auditor-General’s referral powers are not without shortcomings. As depicted in the above 
illustration, upon the end of the process, the investigative body has to update and inform the 
Auditor-General about the outcome. However, there is clearly no recourse for the Auditor-
General in the instance of failure by the investigative body to update and report the 
investigation outcome. The point is, the end-result/manifestation of this power lies not with the 
Auditor-General, but with the investigative body. In the case studies, it was indicated that 
referrals were previously made to SAPS and SIU, but no results were noted. Therefore, it is 
argued that this power is more unlikely to have any significant impact in practice. 
 
571  AGSA ‘Audit perspectives: Audit Act Amendments aim to foster clean governance in the public sector’ 
available at https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/AuditPerspectiveAGApril2019.pdf (accessed 05 October 2019).  
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5.3.2. Taking a remedial action 
Section 5A(1) of the PAAA requires the Auditor-General to make a follow-up on whether the 
accounting officer or executive authority has implemented the recommendations contained in 
the audit report relating to any material irregularity. An ‘accounting officer’ is a person 
identified as such by the MFMA (in the context of this study, the MM) or any person designated 
as such, whilst the ‘executive authority’ means an authority identified as such by the relevant 
law (in this study, the municipal council).572 Failure to implement the audit recommendations, 
the Auditor-General is required to take appropriate remedial action to address such failure. The 
diagram below illustrates how the process unfolds.  
Figure 4: Process for the Auditor-General’s remedial action 
 
Source: AGSA (2019).   
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5.3.2.1. Assessment 
It is fitting to set the record straight on the legal effect of Auditor-General’s recommendations, 
that they are not binding. This means that they are complied with on a voluntary basis and one 
may simply choose to disregard them. Section 5A of the PAAA introduces binding remedial 
action. However, the apparent flaw with this provision is that it is incidental, secondary and 
dependant on the non-implementation of a non-binding audit recommendation. Alternatively 
put, such power can only be exercised after a failure has already ensued. In that way, it is not 
preventive in purpose, but retrospective. In comparison, the Public Protector’s 
findings/recommendations are binding and subject only to judicial review.573 Thus, it is argued 
that the Auditor-General’s recommendations be of same formulation and effect.  
5.3.3. Issuance of certificate of debt 
Where the failure to implement the remedial action resulted in a financial loss, section 5B of 
the PAAA requires the Auditor-General to issue a certificate of debt to the accounting officer 
to pay back to the State the amount stipulated in the certificate. The Auditor-General must also 
serve a copy of certificate on the executive authority (council), which must then ensure the 
collection of repayment and keep the Auditor-General informed of the progress in that regard. 
This amount of money might be an irregular, fruitless or unauthorised expenditures. 
5.3.3.1. Assessment 
The fact that the responsibility to collect repayment does not lie with the Auditor-General is on 
its own problematic. Here, again, the eventual intended effect of the provision lies somewhere 
else i.e. municipal council (executive authority).574 The council (or some of its members) may 
also be implicated or simply become reluctant to act due to party loyalty towards the accounting 
officer (MM). This is one other hazard of cadre deployment, to be discussed in the next section.   
Apart from that, at a practical level, these powers do not seem to be feasible or realistic. The 
case studies showed that irregular and fruitless expenditures often counts up to millions of 
rands and under ordinary discourse, recovering such a large sum of money from the MM alone 
is highly improbable. For instance, it was indicated that there was a R144 million illegal sale 
of land in Mahikeng; R38 186 563 of unauthorised expenditure in Ditsobotla and R31 098 699 
irregular expenditure in Tswaing. It is highly improbable that this large sums of money would 
have easily been recovered from the respective MMs. 
 
573  EFF Case (2016) para 71. 
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Therefore, it is argued that the imposition of liability measure is impractical and too far-fetched. 
Below is the diagram illustrating how the certificate is to be imposed. 
Figure 5: Auditor-General’s certificate of debt process 
 
Source: AGSA (2019). 
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5.4. Other factors 
As indicated, the problem does not only lie primarily with the legal framework. The real 
problem lies with the various institutions themselves, lacking the skills, resources and political 
will to ensure compliance with the Auditor-General’s recommendations. Other non-legal 
factors are discussed below. 
5.4.1. Lack of (and poor) internal audit monitoring processes 
The internal audit monitoring process is viewed as a corrective measure to ensure that remedial 
actions are taken on issues identified by the Auditor-General.575 Its significance is also 
recognised in the MFMA.576 It operates under extensive regulatory framework providing 
guidance on its establishment, composition and functions across all municipalities. Putting 
more emphasis on this measure, Motubatse, Barac and Odendaal posit: 
In order to monitor the implementation of audit findings and recommendations, the audit 
committee requires the internal audit to compile a formal findings register that would indicate 
corrective actions taken and list the unresolved findings. This could also assist the audit 
committee in overseeing how management is responding to the recommendations made by 
external and internal auditors. It may also assist the audit committee to affect accountability 
and to follow up on critical audit recommendations.577  
However, despite its significance, the internal audit function in municipalities is faced with 
several challenges and this is evident from the three case studies discussed in the previous 
chapter. These challenges include lack of adequate training and capacity building programmes 
for internal auditors, non-cooperation of other municipal structures and officials with internal 
audit units, as well as financial constraints.578  
5.4.2. Cadre deployment versus competent employment 
Several instances where municipalities failed to recruit competent workforce in key positions 
of finance, procurement and compliance units were highlighted in respect of three case 
 
575  Motubatse N, Barac K & Odendaal E ‘Perceived challenges faced by the internal audit function in the South 
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studies.579 What has turned out to be the norm is the employment of people against recruitment 
policies and not on the basis of their experience, qualifications and competency, but on the 
basis of their loyalty to a ruling political party in a concerned municipality. This emerging 
norm is often referred to as ‘cadre deployment’.580 Cadre deployment, as Twala points out, is 
‘a recipe for a constitutional crisis’581 and it has showcased itself as an undermining factor for 
the dream and vision of developmental local government. The Auditor-General has on multiple 
occasions indicated that the municipalities are excessively reliant on external consultants, with 
exorbitant service fees, to compile financial and other information for audit purposes. In many 
instances where the financial reports are prepared by internal staff (cadres), significant errors, 
inaccuracies and unreliable records were noted.582 All this is attributable to lack of the 
necessary skills and incompetency. 
5.4.3. Ineffective role by other institutions 
Evident from the case studies is that even though other institutions, such as SAPS and SIU, 
have previously tried to assist in addressing the problem, their efforts proven to be inadequate. 
Therefore, unless these institutions have adequate technical support, resources and enough 
workforce, nothing will change and the problem will persist.   
5.5. Conclusion  
This chapter was directly informed by chapter four. It sought to evaluate the legal framework 
and explore non-legal factors that exacerbate the problems exposed by the case studies. The 
chapter first considered legal framework and the indication is that there are indeed some gaps 
in law that needs to be addressed. The chapter went further to evaluate the expanded powers of 
the Auditor-General and found that these powers are more unlikely to have significant impact 
in practice. Lastly, there are several other factors observed from the case studies, namely; lack 
of internal audit monitoring, cadre deployment and other institutions’ lack of skills, resources, 
political will and capacity. The chapter concluded with a brief discussion on each of these 
factors.   
 
579  Ditsobotla (2019) 145 & Tswaing (2018) 169-172. 
580  See Twala C ‘The ANC and the Cadre Deployment Policy in the Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Product of 
Democratic Centralisation or a Recipe for a Constitutional Crisis?’ (2014) 41/2 Journal of Social Sciences 
159-165.  
581  Twala (2014) 159-160.  
582  Ditsobotla (2019) 145. 
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The next chapter presents a general conclusion. It provides recommendations and thus attends 
to the question: are there any legal answers (or real practical responses) that may contribute in 
dealing with these issues?  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, the research questions are answered by drawing together the research findings. 
Then, relying on the scholarly insights emanating from the critical review of literature and the 
practical patterns observed from the case studies, a number of constructive recommendations 
modelled towards addressing the non-implementation of audit recommendations in the North 
West municipalities are presented. Lastly, the chapter highlights issues which may benefit from 
future research.  
6.2. General background 
The main objective of this study was to explore how the different organs of state, concerned 
with sound financial management in municipalities, could see to the implementation of the 
Auditor-General’s reports. This was done with reference to three case studies in the North West 
(Mahikeng, Ditsobotla and Tswaing). The flow of discussions was guided by the research 
question that undergirds the study: How can the Auditor-General’s recommendations be better 
and adequately given effect in the North West municipalities?  
This research question was underpinned by the following ancillary questions:  
1. What is the role of the Auditor-General? 
2. How do municipalities implement audit recommendations? 
3. How can and does the Auditor-General enforce implementation of its recommendations 
against municipalities? 
4. How can and does the provincial government implement audit recommendations in 
municipalities?  
5. How can and does the national government implement audit recommendations in 
municipalities? 
6. Is the current legal framework and other measures for the implementation of audit 
recommendations adequate to extract the most benefit of their desired intent?  
6.3. Answering the research question 
The legal framework for the institutional structures and processes for the implementation of 
the Auditor-General’s recommendations in municipalities was outlined in chapter three. The 
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practical experience of this framework was then explored in chapter four in respect of three 
case studies. Flowing from chapter four is the revelation that these institutional structures and 
process are, in practice, generally poor. This is not sustainable and that is apparent from the 
case study municipalities that have reached the state of financial and operational collapse. In 
chapter five, evaluation was then made to try to understand why the practice (chapter four) 
does not reflect the framework (chapter three). Emerging from the evaluation in chapter five 
are several issues that explain this disjuncture between law and practice. These issues are 
briefly sketched below. 
First, the municipal councils are generally failing to meet their oversight role and, in doing so, 
ensuring that audit recommendations are given full effect. Standing out is their reluctance to 
establish oversight committees, like MPACs, as well as the audit committees to supplement its 
oversight function. This happens despite the significant statutory role of MPACs in ensuring 
that the corrective measures are taken in response to issues raised in audit reports. The other 
point worth mentioning is the municipalities’ common failure to recruit competent staff with 
the necessary skills required to facilitate full implementation of audit recommendations. This 
particular point highlights a need for the institutionalisation of a culture of prudence, discipline, 
ethics, efficiency, adequate controls and accountability that should be central to the municipal 
financial management systems.  
Secondly, as far as the provincial supervision is concerned, it was observed that despite the 
province’s efforts to assist municipalities in improving their financial performance, there were 
no improvements recorded to that effect. Instead, the situation worsened. The study then found 
that the province itself is in a mess and thus it would have been impossible, and perhaps 
wishful, to expect effective supervision from it. This is explained by section 100(1) intervention 
in the province.  
Thirdly, the study observed no significant impact of the national government’s support 
programmes in the case study municipalities, and surely in other municipalities across the 
province. The study found that the supervisory measures, in many instances, were applied in a 
one-size-fits-all manner, and thus being ineffective and not directly responsive to the specific 
needs and issues of individual municipalities. Despite national government’s support, the 
municipalities continued to obtain poor audit outcomes and retained their culture of non-
compliance with audit recommendations.     
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Fourthly, the study demonstrated how other institutions, such as SAPS (Hawks), SIU and the 
PP have attempted to enforce compliance with audit recommendations in municipalities. 
However, their efforts have also proven to be ineffective and the reason for this, apart from the 
political environment of impunity, is the poorly co-ordinated multi-agency network towards 
addressing the problem. What was also observed is that civil society organisations in the North 
West play a minimal role in addressing this problem, at least not in the three municipalities 
explored in this study, where there is no trace of civil society’s involvement. 
Lastly, the study found that there is little prospect of success for the Auditor-General to be able 
to effectively enforce compliance with his audit recommendations against municipalities. 
Looking at his expanded executive powers, the study doubts the perception and narrative which 
seeks to suggest that these powers will provide a form of magic bullet that will solve deeply-
rooted problem of non-compliance and impunity across the North West municipalities.  
In sum, the issue of non-implementation of audit recommendations in municipalities is very 
complex and hard to resolve. Therefore, to think that a mere expansion of the Auditor-
General’s executive powers is a magic bullet to solve this problem is an irrational expectation. 
The realistic means and way forward to address the problem, it is argued, begin with the 
construction of a consistent and well-coordinated multi-agency approach.  It was against this 
premise that this study extended its reach on the other structures and institutions, apart from 
the Auditor-General, that may play a role or two in resolving the problem.  
6.4. Recommendations and their implications on law, policy and practice  
In view of the foregoing discussion, the following recommendations are proposed to improve 
the state of compliance with audit recommendations in municipalities. These recommendations 
are by no means a silver bullet that will solve all the issues confronting the North West 
municipalities, but it is believed that they present a fresh look at some of the issues.  
6.4.1. The Auditor-General 
The fact that the Auditor-General is given referral powers appreciates the significance of multi-
agency approach and/or inter-institutional collaboration with other role-players in ensuring that 
his audit recommendations are complied with. Therefore, it is recommended that clear 
guidelines and regulations be crafted to guide this collaboration since several loopholes and 
uncertainties exist, as identified in chapter five. Further clarity is also needed on the Auditor-
General’s powers to impose liability on defaulting officials. Here it is recommended that the 
Auditor-General should be empowered to sue outright, and not through the executive authority, 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za/
101 
 
as currently framed. Furthermore, it is recommended that the recommendations of the Auditor-
General, like those of the PP, be of binding effect on the auditee institution. This bears great 
potential to enhance compliance.   
6.4.2. Municipalities 
There is a general need for a change and reform in the culture, perceptions and certain practices 
of municipal officials. The general oversight mechanisms should be strengthened and, among 
others, this can be done by establishing oversight committees, such as MPACs and audit 
committees. In respect of MPACs’, fast-tracking of the adoption of the Municipal Structures 
Amendment Bill is recommended due to its promise of switching the compulsory mode 
towards the establishment of MPACs. The Bill should be accompanied by regulations to 
provide practical guidance to its provisions (once promulgated). In respect of audit committees, 
the clear terms of reference should be crafted to provide clarity and further insights on the 
committee’s duties and responsibilities. The mere existence of an audit committee is not 
enough, it should be skilled, informed, diligent and probing in fulfilling its oversight function.  
It was demonstrated how the appointments on the grounds of political loyalty/affiliation, and 
not on the skills and experience of the person, can undermine certain fundamental objectives 
of good governance (cadre deployment). This does not only affect efficiency of administration 
due to staff incompetency, but also comes with a financial strain since the municipality must 
rely on the expensive external consultants for certain tasks. Therefore, it is recommended that 
the municipal leadership should recruit members who possess the appropriate skills and 
expertise to effectively discharge their responsibilities, especially in key areas of finance, 
internal audit, performance management and the SCM. This underscores the idea of 
profesionalisation of local government that entails the appointment on the basis of professional 
qualifications, knowledge and subjection to a code of professional ethics.583 The municipalities 
should also adopt fraud prevention and anti-corruption strategies. Additionally, whistleblowing 
and awareness programs on fraud and corruption might also be necessary.  
In order for a municipality to secure a clean audit, it should have a committed leadership with 
impeccable levels of discipline. It should have a sound oversight mechanism in both its 
financial management and operational activities. This kind of a municipality should have 
responsible officials who are transparent and accountable. No municipality in the North West 
 
583  Ntliziywana P Professionalisation of Local Government: Legal Avenues for Enforcing Compliance with the 
Competency Framework (unpublished LLM research-paper, UWC, 2009) 24.  
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is close to this standard, but it is hoped that a change might come with this recommendations, 
provided they care to implement them.  
6.4.3. Provincial government  
It is further recommended that the North West province, through the department of local 
government and provincial treasury, should assume a more strategic and focused role to 
provide the necessary support and resources to the municipalities with poor audit outcomes. 
The support may take the form of capacity building programmes for officials in key areas such 
as finance and SCM. The implementation of audit recommendations would not be a difficult 
task for a well-trained and skilled official. The provincial SCOPA should also avail technical 
assistance to the members of MPACs in order to improve their efficiency and performance.  
6.4.4. National government  
The three case studies demonstrated that the supervisory measures of the national government 
are also ineffective and the problem was found to be the one-size-fits-all kind of approach. It 
is apparent that this approach is unsustainable and unrealistic given the unique challenges, 
contexts and various factors that set municipalities incomparable with one another. These 
variances, obviously, require unique responses. Therefore, the study recommends the 
implementation of differentiated system of local government. This system will ensure that the 
national government’s support programmes appreciate the differences between the 
municipalities, thus being more responsive and providing relevant means of support to unique 
challenges facing individual municipalities. The study calls on CoGTA to take a firm stance in 
this regard.  
It is also recommended that the NT should exercise its section 216(1) measure to stop the 
transfer of funds to municipalities that are blatantly disregarding audit recommendations. This 
may be an effective tool of encouraging compliance. However, and of course, this should be 
done within the constraints of the prescribed legalities.  
6.4.5. Other institutions 
There are other role-players that may contribute towards the eventual implementation of audit 
recommendations in municipalities. Their potential and mandates were discussed in chapter 
three. These include the PP, SAPS (Hawks), SIU and civil society organisations. Insofar as 
these institutions are concerned, there is a need for clarity in responsibility division, to provide 
practical insights and guidance on who does what when and with whom, as the case might be. 
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This reflects back on the recommendation made earlier, namely; a need for the construction of 
a well-coordinated action plan for multi-agency approach towards addressing the problem.  
6.5. Suggestions for future research agenda  
It is important to restate that the inquiry set out in this paper is necessarily limited in scope and 
effect to three municipalities in the North West. This is the worst performing province 
according to the latest local government audit report (2017/18) of the Auditor-General. Second 
to North West is Free State and, therefore, it may be necessary in the future to conduct the 
study of same nature in respect of Free State. In addition, this study only explored the problem 
of non-implementation of audit recommendations as it relates to municipalities. It may also be 
necessary for future research to explore the problem, this time at a different plane, either 
provincial or national government. Lastly, it may as well be necessary for future research to 
evaluate the efficiency of the Auditor-General, this time in a more comparative sense with a 
view of extracting best practices from other jurisdictions.  
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